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ABSTRACT 
Leaving the Corporate Fold: Examining Spin-Off Actions and Performance.  
(August 2003) 
Matthew Briggs Semadeni, B.S., Brigham Young University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Albert A. Cannella, Jr. 
 
This research examines the exit of a subsidiary from its corporate parent through 
spin-off, the actions taken by the firm management post spin-off, and the performance 
implications of those actions, all from the spin-off’s perspective.  While spin-off 
announcements are generally met with a positive stock market reaction, what occurs post 
spin-off remains largely unexamined, with performance predictions regarding spin-off 
firms often being equivocal.  This raises questions as to what generates positive 
performance for spin-off firms, with agency, transaction cost, and upper echelons 
theories offering differing, and sometimes conflicting, predictions.  By integrating these 
theoretical perspectives, a model of managerial action and its performance implications 
is presented.  The model examines how the formation of new top management, the 
establishment of managerial monitoring and incentives, and the severance effects from 
leaving the corporate structure affect strategic, financial, and institutional actions, and 
how these actions affect performance.   
The theory and hypotheses developed in this research are empirically tested on a 
sample of 176 corporate spin-offs completed by publicly traded firms between 1986 and 
1997.  Results for the action-based models indicate that background of the CEO or the 
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top management team (TMT), as well as CEO options, had no effect on actions.   CEO 
and TMT ownership had opposite effects on financial actions, with TMT ownership 
increasing the likelihood of strategic actions and CEO ownership increasing the 
likelihood of institutional actions.  Ownership by the parent firm and monitoring by 
officers of the parent serving as board members had no effect on the likelihood of 
actions, although having a chairman of the board from the parent decreased the 
likelihood of strategic actions.  Finally, severance effects had limited influence on the 
actions taken post spin-off.   
Results for the performance-based models indicate that strategic actions were 
negatively related to return on assets (ROA), while financial and institutional actions are 
positively related to ROA and institutional actions are positively related to market 
performance.  In general, inaction was related to lower Tobin’s q, with the signs of the 
coefficients for the other performance models negative, but not significant.  Finally, the 
spin-off firm’s relationship with its corporate parent had limited effect on the link 
between actions and performance.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Within the field of strategy, the use of corporate restructuring strategies to create 
shareholder value has received much attention (Donaldson, 1994; Gilson, 2001; 
Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994). * When initiating a restructuring, corporate managers often 
deem it beneficial to separate a subsidiary from the corporation and a prevalent and often 
efficient method of doing this is through spin-off.  A spin-off is defined as the 
“divestment of a business division to shareholders through a distribution of the 
subsidiary’s common stock in the form of a dividend” (Miles & Woolridge, 1999: 1).  
While a notable body of research exists on corporate spin-offs, very little has examined 
the spin-off event from the spin-off’s perspective.  To date, much of the extant research 
on corporate spin-offs has focused on either the parent firm (e.g., Daley, Mehrotra, & 
Sivakumar, 1997; Desai & Jain, 1999) or the market value created by the spin-off (e.g., 
Miles & Rosenfeld, 1983; Rosenfeld, 1984), with little attention given to the spin-off’s 
performance, whether market or otherwise (see Woo, Willard and Daellenbach (1992) 
for a notable exception).  Consequently, this research examines the spin-off event from 
the spin-off’s perspective.  
Spin-offs are theoretically interesting both managerially and organizationally for 
several reasons.  From a managerial perspective, while all initial public offerings, equity 
carve-outs, and spin-offs are marked by changes in managerial discretion, establishment 
                                                 
*This dissertation follows the style of the Academy of Management Journal. 
  
 
2
of external monitoring, and increased information disclosure, a spin-off requires the 
designation of top officers to manage the new entity.  These top officers may come from 
various backgrounds (e.g., divisional managers, corporate managers, or outsiders), and 
as such would bring to the spin-off different types of human capital, some firm specific 
and some more general in nature.  In addition, the new CEO and top management will 
have operational, financial, and institutional responsibilities, some of which were not 
required of the spin-off while it was part of the parent’s corporate structure.  This 
portends the necessity of new or different human capital requirements for the spin-off to 
succeed.   
From an organizational perspective, spin-offs will experience severance effects 
from leaving the corporate structure of the parent firm.  Spin-off often requires the new 
firm to renegotiate contracts, find sources of capital funding, restructure operations to 
compensate for lost efficiencies of integration or scope, or establish itself as an 
independent entity within its institutional environment.   Consequently, the spin-off is 
almost always in a situation where substantial action must occur to address the effects of 
departure from the corporate environment of the parent firm.  These managerial and 
organizational aspects of spin-offs present an interesting setting to evaluate if managerial 
action will occur and how that action affects firm performance. 
Multiple theoretical perspectives have been applied to examine corporate spin-
offs, yet there has been no holistic examination from the firm’s debut through its 
subsequent years of performance.  This gap is addressed here by proposing a theoretical 
model derived from upper echelons theory, agency theory, and transaction cost 
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economics that examines the post-debut influence of new top management on 
managerial actions as well as the effect of managerial actions on spin-off performance. 
PURPOSE 
The purpose for this research is two-fold.  The first is to understand how the 
spin-off affects top management action.  The top managers of spin-off firms are 
motivated to act by both the incentives embedded in the new governance relationship as 
well as hazards posed by severance effects accompanying the spin-off’s exit from the 
parent’s corporate structure.  Moreover, spin-offs are not disadvantaged by liabilities of 
newness or liabilities of smallness inherent to many new firms (Singh, Tucker, & House, 
1986; Stinchcombe, 1965).  Hence, a situation exists that should motivate the top 
management of the spin-off to take actions to address opportunities and threats inherent 
to the spin-off event.  These firms are, however, subject to structural inertia (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984) influencing both internal (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and external 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983a; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) actions, making actions in the 
face of change difficult and even dangerous (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993).   
Moreover, the human capital composition of the new top management may limit its 
ability to perceive the need for action (Ocasio, 1997), or even to take action if the need is 
perceived (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Thus, this research seeks to better understand 
management actions to take advantage of the opportunities and to mitigate the threats 
inherent to market debut. 
A second purpose is to understand the performance implications of the 
governance change from corporate subsidiary to publicly traded firm.  While the debuts 
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of spin-off firms are often greeted with market gains (Hite & Owners, 1983; Miles & 
Woolridge, 1999; Schipper & Smith, 1983; Seward & Walsh, 1996), the realization of 
improved performance has been equivocal (Desai & Jain, 1999; Miles & Woolridge, 
1999; Woo et al., 1992).    This raises an interesting discontinuity based in differing 
theoretical perspectives.  For example, agency theory posits the spin-off should 
experience gains from better monitoring of and incentives for management, while 
transaction cost logic suggests that spin-offs will experience both gains and losses 
accompanying their exit from the corporate structure.  Additionally, upper echelons 
theory suggests that the characteristics of the spin-off’s newly formed top management 
and an increase in organizational discretion will have substantial impact on what actions 
are taken, which in turn affects the performance of the spin-off (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984).  This research seeks to reconcile these perspectives by developing a model based 
upon three theoretical perspectives that examines firm performance following spin-off.   
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
 The model of spin-off action presented in this research makes several 
contributions to the strategy literature.  First, the model addresses human capital issues 
in the formation of the spin-off’s top management.  The model proposes that the 
previous positions held by the spin-off’s CEO and top officers (with their attendant 
human capital accumulation) will affect the actions taken by the spin-off, and will 
ultimately affect spin-off performance.  The model extends the preliminary theory 
developed by Hambrick and Stucker (1999) and the empirical work done by Wruck and 
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Wruck (2002), who found that stock market reaction to the spin-off announcement was 
affected by the composition of the top management team. 
Second, the model emphasizes the importance of actions taken by the spin-off.  
Prior research on spin-offs has treated the spin-off firm as a black box, examining post 
spin-off performance with limited consideration of intervening actions taken by top 
management.  The model proposes three categories of action: strategic, financial, and 
institutional, and defines the relationship between top management composition and 
managerial actions.  The model also ties these actions to market, accounting, and 
managerial performance measures, providing a better view of how top management 
actions affect firm performance post spin-off. 
Finally, the model provides a more holistic perspective of spin-offs in general, 
reconciling perspectives from agency, transaction cost economics and upper echelon 
theory.  The model provides a multidimensional approach that offers a better insight than 
the unidimensional theoretical perspectives that have been applied in past research.  This 
is particularly important in examining differing predictions.  For example, taken alone, 
agency theory predicts that performance improves with increased monitoring and 
information disclosure as well as with performance contingent contracts, suggesting that 
spin-offs should experience positive performance.  The transaction cost perspective, 
taken alone, predicts that there will be both losses and gains accompanying the 
severance from a corporate parent, which include the losses of economies of scope, 
integration, or internal capital markets, and the renegotiation of contracts.  Upper 
echelons theory, by itself, predicts that managerial characteristics and composition, as 
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well as managerial discretion, will have a substantial impact on what actions are taken 
by the spin-off, and the actions taken by management will affect spin-off performance.  
Hence, a multidimensional theoretical approach is required to reconcile the various 
perspectives.   
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How does the composition of the spin-off’s top management affect subsequent 
strategic, financial, and institutional actions? 
2. Do severance effects from leaving the parent’s corporate structure affect the 
relationship between top management composition and managerial actions? 
3. Does monitoring by the board of directors affect the relationship between top 
management composition and managerial actions, particularly monitoring by top 
managers from the former parent corporation? 
4. Does the level of parent corporation ownership post spin-off affect the actions 
taken by top management? 
5. Do incentive contracts and managerial ownership affect the relationship between 
top management composition and managerial action? 
6. What are the performance implications of strategic, financial, and institutional 
managerial actions taken by the firm post spin-off? 
7. Do severance effects from leaving the parent’s corporate structure affect the 
relationship between managerial actions and spin-off performance? 
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OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODS 
The theory and hypotheses developed in this research are empirically tested on 
corporate spin-offs completed by firms publicly traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or the NASDAQ that occurred from 1986 to 
1997.  The time period selected covers both periods of recession as well as economic 
growth, increasing the generalizability of the results.  Up to a five-year panel of data is 
collected for each spin-off, comprising data from the five years post spin-off.   The data 
were extracted from various archival sources with the complete database containing 
information on top management composition, board composition, managerial 
compensation and ownership, relationship with the former parent, managerial actions, 
and performance.  Time series cross-sectional (TSCS) linear models using feasible 
generalized least squares (GLS) are estimated (Maddala, 1992) as well as random effects 
TSCS negative binomial regression models (Long, 1997).   Models of this type are 
commonly found in econometric analyses (Greene, 2000).      
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter II provides a 
review of the relevant literature focusing primarily on agency theory, transaction cost 
economics, and upper echelons perspectives of spin-off.  Chapter III provides a brief 
discussion of spin-offs, concentrating on the motivations as well as the opportunities that 
the spin-off event presents to the parent firm, the spin-off firm, and to the shareholders.  
Chapter IV develops theory and hypotheses by integrating the three theoretical 
perspectives covered in Chapter II into a model of spin-off action and performance post 
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debut.  Chapter V describes the research methods used to empirically test the hypotheses 
generated in Chapter IV. 
Chapter VI presents the results of the empirical tests for the hypotheses generated 
in Chapter IV.  Chapter VII provides a discussion of the results reported in Chapter VI.  
Chapter VIII presents conclusions, limitations of the study, and implications for research 
and practice. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the extant finance and 
management literature surrounding corporate spin-offs.  Corporate spin-offs have been 
examined from three major theoretical perspectives: agency theory (Aron, 1991; 
Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999), transaction cost economics (Desai & Jain, 1999; 
Hite & Owners, 1983; Schipper & Smith, 1983), and most recently upper echelons 
theory (Hambrick & Stucker, 1999; Wruck & Wruck, 2002).  Some cross-theoretical 
perspectives have also emerged (Seward & Walsh, 1996; Woo et al., 1992).  By 
reviewing the related literature in these three theoretical perspectives, a basis for further 
theoretical integration will be developed.  
AGENCY THEORY 
Agency theory has a rich multi-disciplinary tradition in the fields of economics, 
finance, and management, as well as others (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In particular, the 
corporate control aspect of agency theory is relevant to spin-offs.  The general thrust of 
the theory centers on the misalignment of incentives, leading to differing risk 
preferences between principals (owners) and their agents (managers).  This 
misalignment is further affected by information asymmetry between principals and 
agents, which may lead to opportunism on the part of the agents.  Although applicable to 
many settings, agency theory focuses on the separation of ownership and control in large 
corporations.  For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) examined the ownership 
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structure of the firm, particularly how ownership by managers aligns the managers’ 
interests with those of the shareholders.  Fama (1980) examined the role of managerial 
and capital markets as efficient mechanisms to curb opportunistic behavior by managers.  
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that the board of directors acts as an information 
channel that stockholders can use to monitor top management to preclude opportunistic 
behavior.  In general, agency theory proposes that alignment of incentives and lower 
information asymmetry decreases agency problems.   
In the particular case of spin-offs, the agency issues are multi-faceted, addressing 
different sets of principals and agents.  For example, Aron (1991) uses an agency theory 
perspective to argue that the spin-offs are ex ante effective for the motivating of 
divisional managers (as agents) by corporate managers (as principals).  In other words, 
she argues that the spin-off possibility provides incentive to the divisional managers to 
run their division in the best interests of the corporation (since it may be spun-off) rather 
than trying to obfuscate the true performance to maximize their personal benefit at the 
expense of the corporation.  She states, “when a division is part of a multiproduct 
corporation, the stock value of the firm is a noisy signal of the market’s evaluation of 
any one divisional manager’s productivity” (1991: 506).  Although accounting 
performance measures exist, divisional managers may manipulate many of these 
measures, leading to a misalignment of corporate and divisional incentives.  Aron states, 
“the difficulty with compensating a manager as a function of accounting value of his 
division is that as long as net cash flows differ from accounting income, the manager’s 
incentives will differ from the desires of the shareholders.  For example, suppose the 
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manager knows that it is an appropriate time to build a new plant….the effect of the 
investment may well be to increase the value of the firm but to depress the accounting 
return [of the division] because of a large expenditure” (1991: 507).  Since divisional 
managers have the best information as to when these expenditures should be made, they 
may exploit this information asymmetry between them and corporate managers to their 
best advantage, leading to potential opportunism and increasing the bureaucratic costs of 
monitoring by corporate managers (Jones & Hill, 1988).  If, however, the divisional 
managers hold the belief that their divisions could be spun-off, providing the opportunity 
for the divisional managers to gain from market direct incentives based on their 
performance, they will act in such a way to maximize their divisional performance in 
harmony with market performance, thus achieving the objective of corporate managers 
and reducing agency costs.   
More traditional principal-agent relationships (cf. Berle & Means, 1932) exist in 
the agency perspective on spin-offs as well.  Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) 
argue that spin-offs often occur where a higher degree of information asymmetry exists 
between top managers and owners, and that this asymmetry is lessened by the spin-off 
event.  Measuring the information asymmetry as the difference between analyst 
projections and actual earnings, they found that valuations improved significantly 
subsequent to the spin-off event, indicating greater clarity in the principal-agent 
relationship for both the parent and the spin-off.  In this same vein, Allen (2001) found 
that spin-off top managers invested substantially in the new firm post spin-off, and this 
was significantly related to positive abnormal returns.  His research indicates both a 
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decrease in the level of information asymmetry (given that such purchases are publicly 
disclosed) and an increase in the alignment between owners and managers through 
increased ownership by top managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Finally, Allen and colleagues (Allen, Lummer, McConnell, & Reed, 1995) 
argued that spin-offs often represent a “correction of error” when the spun-off subsidiary 
is a previous acquisition.  They argued and found that the negative investor reaction to 
the acquisition was negatively and significantly related to the positive investor reaction 
to the spin-off announcement.  They argue that the results suggest that the information 
asymmetry and potential opportunism created by the acquisition of the subsidiary is 
reversed to some degree in the spin-off (Amihud & Lev, 1981).   
Conclusions  
In conclusion, two points are worth noting regarding the relationship between 
agency theory and spin-offs.  First, spin-off affects the information asymmetry between 
shareholders and managers by changing information disclosure requirements and 
managerial monitoring.  Post spin-off, the firm is required to disclose financial 
accounting and organizational information in filings with the SEC, increasing the ability 
of principals to observe the actions of the agents.  However, a board of directors, rather 
than corporate management, monitors the firm after spin-off and this may indicate a 
decrease in monitoring of the spin-off management.  Corporate managers are generally 
able to exact detailed subsidiary information from divisional heads and are generally 
cognizant of the operations of the subsidiary.  In contrast, the board is often limited in its 
ability to exact information from the firm’s management and may have less knowledge 
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of the operations of the spin-off.   There is, however, a decrease in the bureaucratic costs 
described by Jones and Hill (1988) that are incurred as corporate managers monitor 
divisional managers.  These costs are borne by shareholders of the corporation and are 
eliminated by the spin-off of the subsidiary, ostensibly making the spin-off more 
efficient. 
Second, spin-off allows for better managerial incentive arrangements.  As an 
independent market entity, the board of directors can draft market-performance 
contingent contracts that will better align the interests of owners and top managers, 
going beyond the sometimes problematic accounting performance measures that are 
often used to evaluate and reward divisional managers.  In addition, top managers may 
now take an ownership stake in their specific company rather than in the larger, 
multidivisional parent corporation.  This change further aligns the interests of top 
management and owners (McConnell & Servaes, 1990).  In conclusion, it is important to 
note that from an overall agency theory perspective the spin-off event, taken by itself, 
should lead to positive market performance. 
TRANSACTION COST THEORY 
The transaction cost economics perspective (Williamson, 1985) is often used to 
explain the gains from spin-offs.  Transaction cost logic was initially proposed as a 
theory to define the boundary between markets and hierarchies (Coase, 1937), with the 
focus of the theory being to minimize costs.  Simply stated, the market will be selected 
over hierarchy when the transaction costs fall below the bureaucratic costs of 
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maintaining the hierarchy, while hierarchy will be selected over markets when the cost 
of transaction exceed the bureaucratic costs of the hierarchy (Coase, 1937).   
Transaction cost theory gained prominence by providing a dominant rationale for 
explaining the use of the multidivisional structure and vertical integration.  For example, 
Teece (1980) argued that when economies of scope are based on proprietary knowledge 
or the use of a specialized, indivisible asset, diversification is a transactionally efficient 
manner of organizing.  Teece (1982) expands this perspective arguing that 
diversification is an efficient way to overcome high transaction costs associated with 
trading the services of specialized assets (particularly organizational knowledge) in 
multiple markets.  Klein and colleagues (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978) argued that 
internalization through vertical integration led to lower economic costs when production 
involved the use of specialized assets.  The internalization process lowered the 
information asymmetry that would otherwise exist between buyers and sellers 
(Williamson, 1975) as well as obviating the need for complex contracts (Arrow, 1974).  
Finally, Jones and Hill (1988) provide a useful discussion of the transaction cost 
perspective behind the various diversification forms (related, vertical integration, and 
unrelated), as well as a description of the boundary conditions and performance 
implications for the various forms of diversification. 
Regarding spin-offs, Hite and Owners (1983) use a transaction cost perspective 
to describe spin-offs as the antithesis of mergers.  They state that while the logic 
surrounding mergers is often “2+2 = 5”, the logic of spin-offs is “4 – 2 = 3”.  They 
argued and found that spin-offs offer both parent and spin-off a way to eliminate 
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diseconomies in contracting, offering greater contracting flexibility to both in the future, 
thereby lowering transaction costs and improving market performance.  Similarly, 
Schipper and Smith (1983) examined market reaction to spin-off announcements by 
examining the assertion of Galai and Masulis (1976) that spin-off gains were the result 
of wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders through a redistribution of claims 
on corporate assets.  They found that shareholder gains come from decreased transaction 
costs through tax or regulatory advantages as well as better managerial governance 
rather than from the wealth transfer assertion.  Moreover, Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) 
found that spin-off announcements enhance shareholder wealth and argue that this 
wealth creation occurs due to the elimination of negative synergies rather than the 
transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders.   
Spin-offs, however, are not always marked by positive performance, particularly 
in the area of operational performance.  For example, Daley and colleagues (1997) found 
that post spin-off operating performance improved for the parent but not for the spin-off.  
They reconciled this with the positive abnormal returns that mark the announcement of a 
spin-off by proposing that spin-offs provide a focus-increasing event for the parent firm, 
but are not always in the best interest of the spin-off since it will be severed from the 
corporate resource base.  In this same vein, Silberman (1995) found that operating 
performance of the parent and spin-off, taken together, does not significantly increase 
post spin-off, and that the operating performance of the spin-off decreases post spin-off.  
Furthermore, Powers (1999) argued that spin-offs are generally motivated by a desire to 
eliminate structural inefficiencies for the parent firm rather than to benefit the spin-off.  
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Examining a cross-industry sample of 51 spin-offs during the period from 1975 to 1986, 
Woo and colleagues (1992) also noted that no spin-offs showed post spin-off 
improvements in operating performance, and some, particularly spin-offs that were 
unrelated to their former parents’ business, were marked by declines.  The researchers 
were somewhat puzzled by this finding and called for further research to determine what 
affects performance in spun-off firms.   
On a positive note, Powers (1999) found that spin-offs in good (bad) industries 
tend to invest less (more) relative to their stand alone industry peers if the other divisions 
of the parent are in good (bad) industries, but this pattern goes away post spin-off.  This 
demonstrates that under the corporate structure, profitable divisions subsidize less 
profitable ones (Scharfstein & Stein, 1997), but that this possibly inefficient behavior is 
eliminated through the spin-off. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, several points are noteworthy.  First, transaction cost logic is a 
dominant rationale for diversification (Jones & Hill, 1988), and it also provides a 
rationale for spin-offs.   Several researchers have found contracting, tax, or regulatory 
advantages arising from spin-offs, each of which will decrease the transaction cost of the 
parent corporation, the spin-off firm, or both.  For example, a spin-off event may allow 
the parent corporation or the spin-off firm to renegotiate a long-term contract to obtain 
better terms or to end a contract completely (for example, see Salter, 2000).  However, it 
is important to note that the transaction cost effects of the spin-off event on the spin-off 
firm remain largely unexplored in spin-off research. 
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Second, spin-off eliminates any corporate cross-subsidies that the spin-off may 
have been paying to subsidize or have been receiving from other divisions of the firm.  
The spin-off event separates the firm from the corporation’s internal capital markets, 
forcing it to seek other sources of capital to support its operations.  While this may 
decrease the transaction costs of spun-off subsidiaries that were paying out to other 
divisions, it will increase the transaction costs of spun-off subsidiaries that were 
receiving support from other divisions as they seek to replace their lost internal capital 
financing.  
Finally, several researchers have found that operating performance either stays 
the same or declines for spin-offs post debut.  Although some researchers acknowledge 
that their window of observation may need to be longer to find performance 
improvements (e.g., Woo et al., 1992), in general the operating performance stasis or 
decline post spin-off suggests that the spin-off firms are experiencing higher costs post 
spin-off than they did as a subsidiary of the parent corporation.  Overall, from a 
transaction cost perspective the performance implications of debut via spin-off are 
somewhat equivocal. 
UPPER ECHELONS THEORY 
Upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) has recently been applied to 
the examination of spin-offs.  Upper echelons theory argues that firms are reflections of 
their top managers and that the characteristics of the top managers (i.e., biases, 
preferences, knowledge and skills) will affect their strategic decisions for the firm.  This 
perspective is based upon the bounded rationality and vision of top management in the 
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execution of their tasks.  Hambrick and Mason argue that the field of vision of managers 
will be selective, and what is viewed will be interpreted through “filters woven by one’s 
cognitive base and values” (1984: 195).  This perspective is also proposed by Ocasio 
(1997), who described managerial attention as being focused on certain items and 
actions to the exclusion of others.  Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) further develop this 
logic by arguing that the perspective and attention of a CEO changes over the CEO’s 
tenure, moving through several “seasons” with different foci and outcomes.  Finally, 
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) propose that discretion is an important factor in 
assessing what actions top management will take.  They propose three types of 
discretion, namely environmental (discretion outside the firm), organizational (discretion 
within the firm), and individual (discretion of personal action).  Spin-off has a 
substantial impact upon organizational discretion, given that the new top management is 
effectively loosened from its corporate parent to take action, but environmental and 
personal discretion remain largely unchanged by the spin-off event.   
Taken together, the upper echelons perspectives argue that top management 
characteristics and composition will have a significant impact on the attention and 
decisions of top management, thereby affecting the actions taken by the firm.  
Additionally, there are temporal elements such as the “season” of the CEO’s tenure (and, 
by extension, top management tenure) to consider.  From the perspective of spin-offs, all 
CEOs and top managers are technically in the same “season” of their tenures (response 
to mandate) given that spin-off event in effect starts the tenure clock for CEO of the new 
firm (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991).   This may be less the case for insider divisional 
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managers who become top managers.  Insider divisional managers that become the CEO 
or top managers of the spin-off may view the spin-off event as less a resetting of the 
tenure clock than just another stage of their employment with the subsidiary that is now 
an independent firm.  Finally, these top managers are granted greater organizational 
discretion (latitude of action to make changes within the firm) as a result of the spin-off 
event although the other forms of discretion remain unchanged.    
Applying upper echelons theory to spin-offs, Hambrick and Stucker (1999) argue 
that careful consideration needs to be given to the formation of the top management of a 
spin-off.  They assert that getting the right mix of human capital resources (i.e., firm-
specific as well as general knowledge) is essential to the spin-off’s success.  The human 
capital needed to manage the division (i.e., operational knowledge and knowledge of 
corporate resource allocation) is only part of what is needed to manage an independent 
entity, which requires top managers to manage not only operations, but also internal and 
external constituencies.   The management of these constituencies is often symbolic 
(Pfeffer, 1981; Smircich & Morgan, 1982), requiring top managers to have a grasp of the 
institutional environment as well.  Furthermore, spin-off top managers no longer have 
internal capital markets to draw upon, but rather must obtain funds from external sources 
through debt or equity means.   
Wruck and Wruck (2002) empirically examine the issue of top management 
human capital by studying the composition of top management in corporate spin-offs.  
They categorized managers according to their previous employment, yielding the 
categories of insider divisional (with firm-specific human capital), insider corporate 
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(with both firm specific and general human capital), and outsider (with general human 
capital).  They found that the market value created by the spin-off announcement is 
related to the composition of top management, with positive abnormal returns on the 
announcement day related to the presence of both firm-specific and general human 
capital in the spin-off management team. 
Conclusions 
Although the upper echelons perspective has been applied only recently to 
market debuts via spin-offs, it provides several important insights.  First, top 
management characteristics will have a significant impact on the perspective taken by 
top management, with top management vision often being colored or constrained by 
characteristics and past experiences.  This limited perspective may cause top managers 
to focus too much on some items while ignoring or not perceiving others.  This may 
cause problems given that the spin-off firm often confronts situations that are different 
from those addressed in the past.  For example, the spin-off must for the first time 
address issues and constituencies external to the firm, yet the new top management may 
have limited experience with external issues, causing them to not focus on this important 
area.      
Second, in addition to their perspectives, the combination of human capital talent 
held by top management is important in determining future returns.  As a separate, 
independent entity, the spin-off will face a new set of challenges in addition to (or 
sometimes in the place of) those it faced as a division of a corporation.   Failure to array 
the necessary human capital resources in top management is actually marked by a slight 
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negative stock market reaction in some spin-offs (Wruck & Wruck, 2002).  However, 
there has been no in-depth examination of the human capital composition of spin-off top 
management.   
Finally, the spin-off event creates a significant change in organizational 
discretion.  The new top management has much greater latitude of action in governing 
the affairs of the spin-off firm than the divisional management had as a subsidiary of the 
parent corporation.  This increase in organizational discretion, coupled with other 
liberating aspects of spin-off (e.g., access to external capital, contracting independence, 
etc.) sets the stage for managerial action to occur.  In sum, upper echelons theory argues 
that the composition of top management will have an effect on managerial performance.   
CROSS-THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Several cross-theoretical perspectives exist in addition to those described 
previously.  For example, Woo and colleagues (1992) apply both agency theory and 
transaction cost perspectives in their evaluation of post spin-off performance.  They find 
that although spin-offs announcements are generally met with a significant positive 
reaction, to both the parent firm and the spin-off (Seward & Walsh, 1996), the expected 
performance gains for the spin-off are not always realized.  They propose that any gains 
from better monitoring or incentive contracts (as would be predicted by agency theory) 
may be lost through the synergy losses from leaving the related diversified structure (as 
transaction cost economics would assert).  Additionally, they suggest that the spin-off 
firm may have a difficult time changing due to the holdover effects of the parent’s 
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routines and processes, and that a significant re-education may need to take place to 
realize performance gains (as would be predicted by institutional theory).     
Another cross-theoretical perspective is that of Seward and Walsh (1996), who 
examine spin-offs by considering upper echelon and agency issues.  They studied the 
design of efficient internal corporate control mechanisms for spin-off firms and found 
that the selection of the new CEOs, the design of the CEOs compensation contract, and 
the staffing of boards of directors and their governance and control practices are not 
strongly related to the observed positive market reactions to the spin-off announcements.  
Their results indicate that spin-offs facilitate the implementation of efficient internal 
governance and control practices, but that other factors must influence the value created 
by the spin-off announcement.  They state, “we need to understand the relationship 
between the governance and control of a voluntary corporate spin-off, its performance 
and, indeed, its subsequent status as an independent company” and “we need to be alert 
to how restructurings may facilitate the day-to-day strategic management of a firm” 
(Seward & Walsh, 1996: 37 and 38, respectively). 
Conclusions 
These cross-theoretical perspectives provide interesting insights not available 
through the application of a single theoretical approach, but also reveal the need for 
further cross-theoretical work.  Both sets of researchers note their inability to go beyond 
their initial findings, calling for a deeper examination of many of the issues that they 
broach.  Notable among these are the effect of organizational inertia, the severance 
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effects experienced upon exit from the parent’s corporate structure, and the actions taken 
by top managers after the firm debuts in the market.    
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to summarize the relevant literature in the 
area of spin-offs.  The agency theory, transaction cost economics, and upper echelons 
theory literatures have been discussed with particular focus on how they relate to the 
spin-off event or to the spin-off firm.  From this review, several conclusions may be 
reached.  First, although there has been much examination of the spin-off event, and 
some examination of the spin-offs themselves, there has been no holistic examination 
from debut through the subsequent years of performance from any of the theoretical 
perspectives.  For example, there has been no examination of how top management 
composition affects actions taken by the spin-off firm.  Although upper echelons theory 
suggest that top managers will be more likely to take certain actions according to their 
backgrounds, no work exists as yet that examines these actions.  It is clear that a more 
holistic, multi-theoretical approach will be needed to reach a better understanding of the 
effect of the spin-off event on spun-off firms (Singh, 1993).  
Second, there has been no examination of what influences management action 
post spin-off.  Researchers have treated the spin-off firm as a black box, examining 
market and performance data without consideration of how the spin-off event may have 
affected the spin-off firm and its top management.  Agency theory and transaction costs 
economics make predictions about what will occur, but only limited empirical work has 
emerged to examine if these predictions hold for spin-offs.  For example, there has been 
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only limited examination of how the loss of economies that occur when the spin-off 
leaves the corporate structure affects subsequent performance or how the establishment 
of managerial monitoring and incentives for top managers affects subsequent 
performance.   
Finally, examination of what leads to spin-off performance beyond the spin-off 
event is lacking, with only limited study of how the spin-off event affects firm 
performance post spin-off (Silberman, 1995; Woo et al., 1992).  It is also important to 
note that researchers have generally used either market (principally event studies) or 
accounting performance measures to assess the impact of spin-off event on the parent or 
spin-off firm.  This has led to a limited understanding of the performance implications of 
the spin-off event on the spun-off firm and should be addressed to provide a more 
holistic view of the spin-off performance outcome. 
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CHAPTER III 
A DISCUSSION OF SPIN-OFFS 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the various motivations for the parent 
to spin-off a subsidiary as well as the opportunities the spin-off event provides to the 
parent firm, to the spin-off, and to the shareholders of the parent and spin-off.  This 
chapter will provide the context within which the corporate spin-off occurs and some of 
the implications of the spin-off for the various parties involved. 
Tax implication is the overarching criterion governing the distribution of shares 
to shareholders through corporate spin-offs (Miles & Woolridge, 1999).1  The 
distribution will be deemed tax free to both the parent organization and its shareholders 
if the spin-off meets certain conditions.  For example, for the distribution to be 
considered tax free, the parent must divest 80 percent or more of the subsidiary, the 
parent and subsidiary must be engaged in active business for at least five years before 
the distribution date, and the transaction must have a legitimate business purpose (e.g., 
addressing anti-trust issues, increased focus on core businesses by the parent, enhanced 
capital market access, etc.).  It is curious to note that “increasing shareholder value” does 
not constitute a legitimate business purpose per the Internal Revenue Code guidelines 
(Miles & Woolridge, 1999). 
                                                 
1 The tax regulations governing spin-offs are found in Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
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MOTIVES FOR SPIN-OFFS 
Several motivations for spin-offs exist.  First, the spin-off could be required to 
comply with regulatory rulings.  These include regulations surrounding a merger or 
acquisition or to address anti-trust charges.  Such was the case in the break-up of AT&T 
into seven regional Bell operating companies.  Similarly, merger and acquisition 
activity, particularly in insurance or financial services, often requires the parent to divest 
other businesses. It is important to note that spin-offs motivated by regulatory concerns 
do not necessarily improve the operating performance of the parent or the spin-off, and 
may actually lead to a loss of operating efficiency or competitive advantage due to their 
compulsory nature.   
Second, the spin-off could be motivated by a renewed focus on the parent’s core 
businesses.  This was the motive in the spin-off of Earthgrains (bakery goods) from 
Anheuser-Busch (brewing) in 1995 as well as the 1994 spin-off of Bally Health and 
Fitness (fitness centers) from Bally Entertainment (casino operations).  Researchers have 
found that spin-offs motivated by a focus increasing strategy by the parent generally 
improve the parent’s performance (Desai & Jain, 1999), although the same cannot be 
said of the firm that is spun-off.  For example, Daley and colleagues (1997) examined 85 
focus-enhancing spin-offs that occurred between 1975 and 1994 and found that there 
were no significant improvements in the spun-off firms’ return on assets (ROA) during 
the first or second year after spin-off.   
Third, spin-offs could be motivated by a CEO succession event, where the 
organizational attachment to a particular division is low (Duhaime & Grant, 1984).  This 
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is likely to occur when the division is a remnant of a prior acquisition made under the 
tenure of a former CEO (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987).  Under these conditions it is 
often best for the parent and spin-off to part given that low organizational attachment is 
generally accompanied by diminished resource allocation (Duhaime & Grant, 1984) and 
managerial focus (Ocasio, 1997), causing the division to languish under corporate 
control.  Additionally, a CEO succession event is often seen as an opportunity to “clean 
house” (see Staw, Barsade, & Koput, 1997), where the new CEO is given greater 
latitude in restructuring and refocusing the organization.  This increases the likelihood of 
the spin-off of subsidiaries seen by the new leadership as diverging from the parent’s 
corporate direction.   
Fourth, spin-offs may occur to remove excessive volatility from the corporation’s 
performance.  Such was the case in the 1994 spin-off of Cooper Cameron (oil and 
natural gas equipment) from the conglomerate Cooper Industries, which removed its 
exposure to cyclical movements in energy demand.  Similarly, in 1995 Kimberly Clark 
spun off its $500 million cigarette paper operations in a move to distance the company 
from the stigma of being a tobacco industry supplier.  It is important to note that 
although a spin-off of this nature separates the parent from the volatility (economic or 
otherwise), it does not change the exposure of the spin-off to that volatility. 
Fifth, conflict may arise between the corporation and the subsidiary or between 
the subsidiary and a key customer of the corporation.  For example, AT&T announced in 
1995 the spin-off of Lucent and NCR, the primary reason being to avoid possible 
conflicts between the regional Bell operating companies and Lucent or NCR, whose 
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main customers were the regional Bell operating companies (DePamphilis, 2001).  Spin-
offs motivated by conflicts of this type are generally beneficial to both the parent and the 
spin-off.  Through deregulation, AT&T was poised to enter the local telephone market 
and would be competing directly with the regional Bell operating companies.  By 
spinning off Lucent and NCR, AT&T was able to penetrate a new market while 
protecting the markets (telecommunications equipment and information services) of its 
former divisions. 
Finally, a spin-off may be pursued if the parent believes that the combined value 
of the parent and child (under the corporate structure) is less than that which could be 
obtained if the two operated as independent entities.  In other words, the spin-off is not 
undertaken to achieve greater focus or address an organizational issue, but rather to gain 
a better market valuation.  For example, in 1996 Dial Corporation (skin care, laundry, 
household and food) spun off Viad Corp. (airline catering, convention services, leisure 
and payment services) “to achieve a higher valuation by removing a perceived discount 
applied to the companies’ divergent businesses” (Miles & Woolridge, 1999: 10).  This is 
in line with the research of Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), which found that 
spin-off decreases the information asymmetry between the market and the firms.  A 
spin-off under such conditions is generally beneficial to both parent and spin-off.   
Conclusions 
Although the motivations for undertaking a spin-off are varied and diverse, it is 
important to note that the motivations do not always favor the spin-off, but rather are 
generally done in line with the parent firms’ best interests.  This is not surprising given 
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that corporate managers control the fate of the subsidiary and will make decisions based 
on what is best for the corporation rather than the subsidiary.  This point is noteworthy 
because the conditions under which the spin-off event occurs may not be optimal for the 
business that is spun-off, possibly placing it in a precarious position from the outset of 
its existence as an independent, publicly traded firm. 
OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY SPIN-OFFS 
In addition to examining the motivations behind spin-offs, it is important to 
assess the opportunities presented by the spin-off event from three perspectives: the 
parent’s, the spin-off’s, and the shareholder’s.  By examining the opportunities that a 
spin-off presents to each of the parties, it becomes clear that what constitutes an 
opportunity for one party may adversely affect another.   
Opportunities for the Parent  
For the parent, the spin-off event presents the opportunity to obtain greater focus 
(Daley et al., 1997; Desai & Jain, 1999) through restructuring the organization, thus 
creating value (Donaldson, 1994; Gilson, 2001; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994).  In addition to 
this, several researchers argue that parent firms may use spin-offs to obtain contractual 
changes, more favorable tax status, or a better regulatory climate (Hite & Owners, 1983; 
Schipper & Smith, 1983).   
It is important to note that the parent organization, in large measure, dictates the 
terms of the spin-off and generally orchestrates the spin-off to its best advantage.  For 
example, if a parent organization is a significant buyer of the spun-off firm’s products or 
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services, the spin-off firm may exact better terms as a condition for exit from the parent 
organization.  An illustration of this was Electronic Data Systems’ (EDS) requirement to 
give favorable future contract terms on products and services to General Motors (GM) 
prior to its exit from under the GM corporate umbrella.  Additionally, the parent at times 
requires a one-time payment from the spin-off to assuage the costs of separation.   For 
example, in the 1996 spin-off of EDS from GM, EDS paid a one-time fee of $500 
million to GM (DePamphilis, 2001).  Similarly, National Medical Care (NMC), an 
operator of 500 kidney dialysis centers, paid its former parent, W.R. Grace, a special 
dividend of $1.4 billion, which W.R. Grace used to de-leverage its balance sheet (Miles 
& Woolridge, 1999).   
The parent may also use the spin-off event to rid itself of liabilities.  This was the 
case in the spin-off of Cytec from American Cyanamid (Wruck & Roper, 1997) where 
Cytec assumed an inordinate amount of American Cyanamid’s liabilities in the spin-off.  
The parent also shapes the top management of the spin-off, with some suggesting that 
the spin-off may be a muted form of managerial dismissal, with corporate executives 
from the parent assuming top management of the spin-off as a “consolation prize” 
(Wruck & Wruck, 2002).  Hence, the spin-off of a subsidiary provides the parent with an 
opportunity to focus on its core business while potentially relieving itself of 
organizational headaches or even profiting from the separation.   
Opportunities for the Spin-Off 
For the spin-off, the obvious opportunity presented is greater discretion outside 
the corporate structure (Hambrick & Stucker, 1999).  Applying the framework proposed 
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by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), the spin-off event positively affects organizational 
discretion, but does not necessarily affect discretion arising from managers or the task 
environment.  In other words, managers have more latitude in their organizational 
actions (being unleashed from corporate oversight), but will have no change in their 
external environment (e.g., regulations, competitive dynamics, technology changes) or to 
their personal preferences and biases.   
In addition to greater discretion, the spin-off will now have independent access to 
capital markets, allowing it to issue debt or equity as it is needed.  Additionally, as an 
independent entity, most spin-offs will receive better monitoring of their performance by 
analysts (Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999).2  Moreover, because the capital 
markets (rather than the corporate management) will now hold the spun-off firm 
accountable, incentive contracts for top managers may be written based upon firm stock 
performance rather than accounting performance.  This is noteworthy because subsidiary 
managers often have incentives to manipulate accounting performance to their best 
advantage (see Aron, 1991).  Finally, the spin-off has the opportunity to negotiate its 
own contracts, which has been identified by researchers as beneficial in some instances 
(Hite & Owners, 1983; Schipper & Smith, 1983).  Contract negotiation autonomy 
presents an opportunity to the spin-off if it was required to use sub-optimal contract 
negotiated at the corporate level by its former parent.  For example, Salter (2000) found 
this to be a positive argument for the spin-off of Delphi from GM: the spin-off would 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that size does become a factor in determining whether or not analysts would follow 
a given spin-off, with larger spin-offs more likely to receive coverage than smaller spin-offs. 
  
 
32
allow Delphi to negotiate its own, independent contract with the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) rather than have to use the terms set forth by the contract between GM and the 
UAW.  Additionally, the spin-off may be constrained from contracting with a party due 
to its affiliation with its former corporate parent.  For example, the spin-off of EDS from 
GM allowed EDS to market its expertise in the application of technology to automotive 
production to other automakers besides GM.  It is important to note that in general the 
spun-off firm’s bargaining position is usually weakened post spin-off given its smaller 
size and independent status separate from its corporate parent. 
Opportunities for the Shareholders 
Shareholders gain from the spin-off event in two primary ways.  First, 
shareholders generally experience a short-term gain from the announcement of the spin-
off (Miles & Woolridge, 1999), which can generate an abnormal return of 3 to 4 percent, 
but can be as high as 6 percent if the spin-off comprises 10 percent or more of the 
parent’s equity (J.P. Morgan, 1995).  Additionally, if the spin-off event is classified as 
tax-free by the Internal Revenue Service3, this further increases shareholder gains. 
Moreover, Cusatis and colleagues (Cusatis, Miles, & Woolridge, 1993) argue that 
corporate spin-offs present an opportunity for the firm to be economically acquired by 
another firm given that its assets are objectively valued by the capital markets.  If the 
spun-off firm is indeed acquired, the shareholders will probably gain significantly from 
the acquisition (see Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001).   
                                                 
3 The overwhelming majority of spin-offs are classified as tax free, following the rationales set forth in 
Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
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Conclusions 
Market debut via spin-off provides opportunities to the various parties involved.  
As with the motivations for spin-off, it is important to note that what may be an 
opportunity for the parent firm will often translate into a liability for the spun-off firm 
(e.g., accepting inordinate liabilities from the parent, offering favorable future 
contractual terms to the parent, etc.).  However, the opportunities presented to the spin-
off firm do not generally affect the parent firm in a negative fashion.  Overall, the 
shareholder generally benefits from the spin-off, particularly in the near term.   
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the motivations for spin-offs as 
well as the opportunities that spin-offs present to three involved parties, namely the 
parent firm, the spun-off firm, and the shareholders.  Motivations behind spin-off were 
shown to be varied and diverse, with the spin-off often being structured to the advantage 
of the parent with limited consideration of the effect on the business that is spun-off.  In 
addition, the debut of a firm through spin-off presents opportunities to all parties 
involved, but some opportunities are taken at the expense of other parties.  It is 
interesting to note that shareholders are generally agnostic to the issues raised through 
separation insofar as the issues do not effect the market performance of the parent firm 
or the spin-off.  This ambivalence, particularly towards the spun-off business, may be 
due to the ability to liquidate shares in the spin-off if so desired.  The spin-off event 
essentially grants the shareholders greater freedom, allowing them to sell the shares in 
the spin-off if they consider the spin-off’s future as limited. 
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Several issues remain unaddressed in the current perspective on spin-offs.  First, 
what (if any) incentives does the parent have to make the spun-off business succeed?  
Parent firms often retain up to a 20 percent stake in the spin-off, which would suggest 
that they would have not only an interest in the spin-off’s success, but also an oversight 
role through one or more seats on the spin-off’s board of directors.  To date, no theory or 
research has addressed the issues relating to the parent’s involvement with the spin-off 
after the spin-off event (Wruck & Wruck, 2002 broached this subject, but did not 
develop it).   
Second, the current perspective on spin-offs is relatively silent as to the increase 
in organizational discretion of the spin-off after leaving the parent corporation.  
Hambrick and Stucker (1999) identified this as a major motivation for top managers of 
spin-off firms, but no research exists that examines if or how top managers of the spin-
off use this newfound discretion.  Furthermore, the current perspective does not address 
factors that may affect top manager discretion.  For example, although top managers 
may have greater autonomy post spin-off, they may be deficient in resources necessary 
to exploit opportunities that are presented.  In addition, it is arguable that the relationship 
with the former parent will have a significant affect on how top managers use the 
discretion inherent in separation from the parent organization.   Hence, while top 
managers may be motivated to use their newfound discretion, constraints may exist that 
hamper their ability to do so. 
Finally, the current perspective on spin-offs is without any discussion of what 
spun-off firms do post spin-off and does not address the performance implications of 
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spin-off actions.  While some studies have examined spin-off performance (e.g., Daley 
et al., 1997; Silberman, 1995), they treat the spin-off firm as a “black box” without 
considering what actions lead to positive performance.  A more fine-grained approach to 
what actions occur post spin-off, and their attendant performance implications, is needed 
to contribute to the existing literature. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework to examine top 
management actions taken post debut and their effect on performance.  The literature 
review in Chapter II and the discussion of spin-off motivations and opportunities in 
Chapter III provide the foundation for the theory and hypotheses developed in this 
chapter.  The theory development will focus on the integration of the three theories 
described in Chapter II, namely agency theory, transaction cost economics, and upper 
echelons theory.  The conclusions drawn in Chapter II highlighted the lack of an 
integrated theoretical approach to the examination of debut via spin-off as well as some 
theoretical disagreement as to the performance of the spin-off post debut.  For example, 
agency theory proposes that spin-offs will benefit both parents and spin-offs while the 
transaction cost perspective is more cautious, proposing that there may be gains from 
contractual efficiencies, but there will also be substantial severance effects from leaving 
the former parent’s corporate structure.  The conclusions drawn in Chapter III 
highlighted that spin-offs are not always undertaken to further the best interests of the 
spun-off firm, but rather are generally motivated by the desires and exigencies of the 
parent.  This suggests that market debut may not be the optimal decision for the spin-off 
and that separation from the parent corporation may have traumatic effects on the spin-
off.  This chapter focuses on the firm that is spun-off, and seeks to weave together the 
perspectives described in Chapter II into a theory of managerial action post debut.  The 
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intent is to provide an integrated and holistic perspective on what actions are taken by 
the newly public company post debut and the implications of those actions on 
performance.   
MANAGERIAL ACTION 
Managerial behavior is a multifaceted phenomenon (cf. Cyert & March, 1963).  
To address this phenomenon, managerial actions are grouped in three principal 
categories: strategic (affecting the operations or infrastructure), financial (affecting the 
capital structure), and institutional (establishing the spin-off as an independent entity).  
The rationale for categorization is that each category of action will have different 
motivations as well as different consequences for the spin-off.  Precedent exists for the 
examination of managerial actions, with categorizations of this type being used in the 
past.  For example, Gabarro (1987) examined personnel and structural change in his 
study of the actions of new general managers.  More recently, Powers (1999) examined 
structural and financial actions taken by firms undergoing restructuring.  Woo and 
colleagues (1992) stressed that a more fine-grained examination of what occurs post 
spin-off is essential to understanding spin-off performance.  This research proposes that 
the study of top management actions, post debut, will provide the detail necessary to 
better understand the performance implications of market debut for the spin-off.   
Strategic Actions 
The structure of the spin-off has a significant effect on the organization, both in 
the formulation of strategy (Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Chandler, 1962) as well as 
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execution of operations (Mintzberg, 1979).  Therefore, any action to change that 
structure will affect both the strategy and operations of the spin-off, making examination 
of these strategic actions important.  Strategic actions are defined as actions affecting the 
operations or infrastructure of the organization.  Actions of this type would include 
changes in plant and equipment, related or vertical integration acquisitions, divestitures, 
product changes, or labor changes.  These actions are generally taken to improve 
operational or organizational efficiency and usually require knowledge of the operations 
of the organization in order to be effectively executed (Gabarro, 1987). 
Financial Actions 
The finances of the spin-off will have a significant effect on its ability to execute 
its strategy, particularly affecting the firm’s strategic flexibility (Harrigan, 1985; Hitt, 
Keats, & DeMarie, 1998).  Financial resources provide the firm some freedom to pursue 
opportunities (Garud & Van de Ven, 1992) while the absence of financial resources may 
lead to constrained or precarious organizational conditions often necessitating dramatic 
actions (Bibeault, 1981; Hofer, 1980).  Thus, financial actions will have dramatic and 
important effects on the ability of the spin-off to execute its strategy.  Financial actions 
are defined as actions affecting the capital structure of the organization.  Actions of this 
type would include changes in the spin-off’s debt, equity, the firm’s dividend policy, or 
unrelated diversification.  These actions are taken to improve the financial position of 
the firm, to provide the capital resources to embark upon new strategies, or to assuage 
financial burdens.  Additionally, these actions require less firm-specific knowledge to 
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execute, requiring instead knowledge of capital markets as well as the workings of 
financial institutions.   
Institutional Actions 
The institutional environment of the spin-off has an important effect on the 
organization in terms of focusing organizational attention and facilitating or constraining 
certain actions.  The spin-off must conform to industry norms to maintain organizational 
legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983a).  As a result, institutional actions taken by the 
spin-off will have a significant impact on the spin-off’s legitimacy with external 
constituencies.   Institutional actions are defined as actions that seek to establish the 
spin-off as an independent entity apart from the parent firm.  Actions of this type would 
include changing the external auditor, the external counsel, the stock transfer firm or the 
financial institution from that used by the parent firm to a new firm, changes in the board 
of directors, or changes in the spin-off’s name.  These actions are largely symbolic in 
nature (Pfeffer, 1981; Smircich & Morgan, 1982), and often seek to perceptually 
differentiate the spin-off from its parent organization.  As such, these actions are 
outwardly focused and are used to signal external constituencies that the spin-off firm is 
distancing itself from its former corporate parent.   
Conclusions 
Three categories of action (strategic, financial, and institutional) have been 
proposed as important in classifying top management actions taken post debut.  It is 
important to note that these categories of actions are not completely independent of each 
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other.  For example, financial actions will have substantial impact on the spin-off’s 
ability to take strategic actions and vice versa.  Although institutional actions may be 
somewhat more independent of both strategic and financial actions, they too have 
interdependencies.  For example, a firm wishing to take substantial financial actions may 
be reluctant to switch to a new financial institution prior to taking those actions.  
Likewise, firms undertaking strategic actions, such as layoffs, may not wish to change 
external legal counsel prior to the layoffs.  But, despite these interdependencies, it is 
argued that these categories describe separate actions with different motivations as well 
as different consequences, and as such merit separate examination.   
MOTIVES FOR ACTION 
Having discussed actions, the focus now turns to motivations that impel top 
managers to take action.  Agency theory, upper echelons theory, and transaction cost 
economics all suggest that the spin-off event provides substantial motivation for spin-off 
top management to take action.  In addition, it is argued that the debut event itself is a 
signal to the market that organizational actions will be forthcoming.   
Motivations from Agency Theory 
From an agency theory perspective, spin-off management has better market 
performance incentives post spin-off than were present under the corporate structure.  
For example, Seward and Walsh (1996) found that almost two thirds of the top managers 
in newly spun-off firms had some form of performance contingent contract.  Moreover, 
the top managers of spin-offs often have a greater ownership stake in the organization, 
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thereby reducing agency conflicts and increasing performance (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; McConnell & Servaes, 1990).   
In addition to incentives, agency theory suggests that monitoring by internal and 
external constituencies will motivate action.  Top managers of spin-offs are under 
scrutiny, both from the board of directors as well as analysts and investor groups.   This 
scrutiny is different from that received as a division of a diversified corporation. Under 
corporate management, the performance of a subsidiary is primarily gauged by 
accounting numbers, which may be subject to manipulation by subsidiary managers 
(Aron, 1991; Jones & Hill, 1988).  Additionally, subsidiary managers are monitored 
internally, with little or no examination from external groups, and as such may engage in 
organizational politics that are not in the best interests of the shareholders (see 
Scharfstein & Stein, 1997).  In contrast, external constituencies (analysts and investor 
groups) as well as the board of directors monitor the top managers of the spin-off.  
Moreover, the spin-off event is generally used to establish sound monitoring of the spun-
off firm.  For example, Seward and Walsh (1996) found that the majority of the spin-off 
board members were outsiders.  It is important to note that this monitoring may be 
tempered somewhat by the affiliation of the outside directors.  For example, if officers 
from the parent firm have seats on the spin-off’s board, the monitoring of the spin-off 
will probably be more parochial and similar to the divisional oversight given by the 
corporation than the governance of a separate, independent entity.  In other words, if the 
monitoring relationships remain similar to those prior to the spin-off, actions of the past 
may temper the pursuit of opportunity by the spin-off.    
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In sum, the agency theory perspective of spin-offs suggest that there will be 
better alignment of managerial and shareholder interests than was achieved when the 
spin-off was a subsidiary of the parent corporation.  Moreover, although top managers of 
the spin-off have more to gain if they are able to achieve positive performance results, 
they also have more to lose if they do not.  With boards of directors dominated by 
outsiders, top managers of the spin-off will be under pressure to perform, risking 
dismissal if they do not achieve positive performance outcomes. 
Motivations from Upper Echelons Theory 
From an upper echelons theory perspective, top managers of spin-offs generally 
have greater organizational discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).  Top managers 
of spin-offs are no longer beholden to the corporate management for permission to act, 
neither are they constrained by corporate policies, budget cycles, or resource allocations.  
This increased discretion often infuses these spin-offs with an entrepreneurial 
exhilaration (Hambrick & Stucker, 1999; Wruck & Roper, 1997) in addition to greater 
self-determination and organizational latitude.  Additionally, assuming a top 
management position at an independent firm bestows a degree of status and prestige.  
This may be particularly important to subsidiary or corporate managers anxious to prove 
their mettle in the top roles of an independent organization.   
In addition to increased discretion, spin-offs do not suffer from liabilities of 
newness or liabilities of smallness that generally plague new firms (Stinchcombe, 1965).  
The spin-off does not need to legitimize itself in the product marketplace given that it 
has an established track record as a division of a larger firm.  Additionally, the spin-off 
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has established technology (Galbraith, 1973), an existing employee base, standard 
operating procedures and routines in place (Nelson & Winter, 1982), established 
organizational infrastructure (Scott, 1998), and existing customers for its products or 
services.  These conditions situate the top management of the spin-off firm in a position 
to take advantage of the opportunity the spin-off presents.  Given this established base of 
operations, the top managers of the spin-off may focus on taking new actions rather than 
having to overcome operational or institutional issues (Stinchcombe, 1965).   
Finally, it is argued that concomitant with the spin-off event comes a mandate to 
act from the marketplace.  In other words, the shareholders, analysts and investor groups 
do not expect top managers of the spin-off to stand still, but rather to take charge 
(Gabarro, 1987) to realize the opportunities and mitigate the threats of the situation.  
This view is in keeping with Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) who labeled the initial 
season of a CEO’s tenure as the “response to mandate” season.  For spin-offs, this 
mandate to take charge is initially signaled by the abnormal returns in stock price (Hite 
& Owners, 1983; Miles & Woolridge, 1999; Schipper & Smith, 1983), and followed up 
by close observation of managerial action by analysts post spin-off (Krishnaswami & 
Subramaniam, 1999). 
Motivations from Transaction Cost Economics 
From a transaction cost economics perspective, top management will be 
motivated to compensate for the losses of economies from leaving the diversified 
structure of the parent organization.  In their discussion of corporate strategy, Jones and 
Hill (1988) argue that firms must trade off the economic gains from the different 
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corporate strategies against the bureaucratic costs associated with the realization of those 
gains. For example, vertical integration yields economies of integration, related 
diversification yields economies of scope, and unrelated diversification yields economies 
of internal capital markets.  Jones and Hill (1988) propose, following Thompson (1967), 
that another aspect to consider is the interdependence effects of pursuing each strategy.  
They describe how the interdependence effects will vary according to the strategy 
chosen, stating, “each level of interdependence can be viewed as being of a higher order, 
encompassing lower orders within it” (1988: 163).  In this framework, unrelated 
diversified firms have pooled interdependence of internal capital where each division 
contributes to the overall performance of the corporation.  Vertically integrated firms 
have sequentially pooled interdependence where the outputs of one division become the 
inputs of another, sequentially linking the divisions as well as their pooling of internal 
capital.  Related diversified firms have reciprocal sequential pooled interdependence, 
meaning that the divisions are able to share resources in addition to their sequential 
linkages and pooled internal capital.   
Combining these two perspectives of economies and interdependence suggests 
that unrelated strategies will yield benefits from internal capital markets, vertical 
integration strategies will yield benefits from economies of integration and internal 
capital markets, and related strategies will yield benefits from economies of scope, 
economies of integration, and from internal capital markets.  Hence, there is a nesting 
effect of the economies by the degree of interdependence among the divisions of the 
diversified firm.   
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By reversing this logic, it is argued that in exiting the corporate structure of the 
parent, the spin-off will suffer losses of economies according to the spin-off’s 
relationship with the former parent corporation.  In other words, a spin-off that was 
unrelated to the parent corporation will suffer the loss of economies of internal capital 
markets.  A spin-off that was vertically integrated with the former parent corporation 
will suffer losses of economies of internal capital markets and economies of integration.  
A spin-off that was related to the former parent will suffer losses of economies of 
internal capital markets, economies of integration, and economies of scope.  It is argued 
that the loss of these economies will spur top management of the spin-off to take action, 
particularly when they affect core aspects of the spin-off (e.g., production capability, 
ability to finance production, use of a name brand).   
In a related vein, the debut event will change relationships with buyers, suppliers, 
the government, etc., requiring the firm to negotiate contracts that were previously 
negotiated at the corporate level or renegotiate contracts that were severed due to the exit 
from the parent’s governance structure.  Although some of these contract negotiations 
may favor the spin-off, (e.g., long-term agreements to purchase raw materials at a price 
higher than the current market price), others may be less favorable (e.g., renegotiating 
with a supplier as a smaller entity).  Hence, contracts between the spin-off and its buyers 
and suppliers will be affected by severance from the parent firm, suggesting that action 
must be taken post spin-off to address contractual changes.  
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Conclusions 
The proceeding discussion has outlined motivations for action from agency 
theory, upper echelons theory, and transaction cost economics perspectives.  It is clear 
from these theoretical perspectives that motivation for top management action exists 
following spin-off.  Additionally, the motivations for actions are cumulative rather than 
conflicting.  In other words, agency theory motivations (incentives and increased 
monitoring) are in addition to transaction costs economics motives (loss of economies 
and contractual changes) and upper echelons motives (increased organizational 
discretion and mandate for action).  Thus, top managers have abundant motivation to 
take action post debut. 
WILL ACTION OCCUR? 
Despite substantial motivations for action, the question remains whether or not 
action will occur.  Although top management is motivated by both the incentives 
embedded in the opportunities and the hazards of spin-off, it is argued that other 
important forces exist that will influence action.  The focus of this section is to examine 
those forces and their possible effect on top management action.   
Inertia  
It is argued that a spin-off will have holdover effects from being under the 
corporate structure that will propel it along an inertial path.  Hannan and Freeman (1984) 
discuss the properties of this structural inertia and its effects on organizational change.  
They assert that structural inertia is a byproduct of organizational reliability and 
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accountability, which they argue are essential for organizational persistence over time.  
This structural inertia is often embedded in the organizational hierarchies, routines, and 
procedures.  Additionally, following Thompson (1967), they argue that organizations 
have technological cores that are buffered from external effects by the periphery of the 
organization, with the core exhibiting much higher structural inertia than the periphery.  
Furthermore, they argue that organizational legitimacy is garnered over time (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983a), and may be lost through organizational change, further increasing the 
likelihood of structural inertia and resistance to change. 
In a similar vein, Nelson and Winter (1982) propose that important explicit and 
tacit knowledge is embedded in organizational routines that provide the ability to control 
the organization and to replicate results.  Routines also provide a form of organizational 
memory that projects the shadow of past actions and results into the future.  This 
organizational memory has strong inertial tendencies (Walsh & Ungson, 1991).  Hence, 
although the spin-off does not suffer from a lack of crucial organizational routines or 
procedures (i.e., liability of newness), it may suffer from core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 
1992) that lock it into past courses of action.  These core rigidities are reinforced by 
dominant organizational logics (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) as well as psychological 
contracts with organizational members (Rousseau, 1995).   
Institutional Forces 
It is argued that the institutional environment in which the spin-off is embedded 
will have a significant impact on whether or not action will be taken.  Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) propose that organizations conform to rules and that organizational myths 
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become rule-like over time, often ossifying in a way that precludes organizational action.  
Although this institutionalism conflicts with efficiency, it creates and fosters 
organizational legitimacy, both within and outside the organization.  In addition, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983b) discuss the constraining effects of the institutional 
environment, particularly through three forms of isomorphism: coercive (under 
conditions of external authority), mimetic (under conditions of high uncertainty), and 
normative (in the presence of strong norms or values).   In the case of spin-off firms, 
these forms of isomorphism will play a substantial role in defining what actions the 
organization will take.  For example, coercive isomorphism may exist when there are 
substantial links to the former parent firm (e.g., buyer/supplier relationships, board 
interlocks, etc.).  Additionally, mimetic isomorphism may arise as spin-offs face the 
uncertainties of being an independent firm, meeting the demands of shareholders and 
other external constituencies, choosing to copy the others rather than to establish their 
own form.  Finally, normative isomorphism may emerge if the spin-off firm operates in 
a staid industry or in an industry marked by a high degree of tradition, which will limit 
the amount of growth and pursuit of opportunities.   
Constrained Vision 
A final factor influencing whether action will be taken is the perception by 
management that an opportunity actually exists.  Hambrick and Mason (1984) describe 
how top managers often must act on filtered information that is biased by their own past 
experiences.  Top managers with operational backgrounds will, for example, be more 
attuned to operational problems and opportunities, as is the case with those who have 
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marketing and sales, finance, or other backgrounds.  In this vein, Ocasio (1997) argues 
that managerial attention is focused by organizational rules, resources and relationships, 
often leading to organizational blindspots (Zajac & Bazerman, 1991).  Moreover, 
managerial experiences frequently lead to a logical incrementalism (Quinn, 1980) in 
strategy formulation, where “new” strategies are only simple extrapolations of past 
strategies.  In this sense, managers may be locked into exploitation strategies while 
overlooking exploration (March, 1991).  Hence, top management may fail to perceive 
the market debut as an opportunity or a threat, increasing the likelihood that no 
significant action will be taken post debut. 
Conclusions 
From the proceeding discussion it is clear that spin-off firms have obstacles such 
as inertia, institutional forces, and constrained vision that decrease the likelihood that 
action will take place post debut.  Although the spin-off is new to the marketplace as an 
independent firm, it is not new in the sense that it has existing structures and routines 
and is enmeshed in an institutional environment.  Furthermore, spin-off top management 
may lack the insight necessary to perceive the opportunity presented by taking action or 
the threats posed by not taking action.  Therefore, it is not entirely clear that action will 
occur post debut. 
SUMMARY 
In summary, several points are noteworthy.  First, there are many managerial 
actions that may be taken by management after spin-off.  These actions have been 
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categorized as strategic, financial, and institutional actions, with each having its own 
influence on the firm and subsequent performance.  Second, agency theory, upper 
echelons theory, and transaction cost economics all highlight motivations for the top 
management of the firm to take action after spin-off.   The theoretical perspectives reveal 
opportunities arising from the spin-off as well as threats, both of which necessitate 
action.  However, it is not clear that action will be taken given the inertial and 
institutional forces affecting the spin-off.  Moreover, top management may fail to 
perceive a need to take substantive action to address opportunities and threats posed by 
market debut.   
A MODEL OF SPIN-OFF ACTION 
The prior discussion highlights that although top managers of spin-off firms may 
have ample incentive to act, there are strong forces that may preclude or limit the actions 
taken.  Additionally, the extant literature on spin-offs is without any discussion of 
managerial action to take advantage of opportunities or to mitigate threats.  Accordingly, 
a model is presented that outlines top management action based upon the principal 
theories that have been used to examine spin-off events (see Figure 1).  The model 
focuses on top managers because they are the organizational decision makers with the 
ability to take action as well as having the responsibility for the performance of the firm 
(Barnard, 1942; Hambrick, 1989; Selznick, 1957).   
The proposed model is based on the three key changes accompanying the debut 
of a spin-off firm, namely the formation of a top management group for the spin-off, 
establishment of incentive contracts for top management as well as monitoring by a 
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board of directors, and severance effects experienced due to exit from the parent’s 
corporate structure.  In the model the effects of each of these changes on managerial 
action are assessed, with the actions taken then linked to firm performance. 
Top Management 
Corporate spin-off requires the formation of a top management group in the place 
of the divisional management structure.  In examining the new top management, it is 
argued that the human capital of the CEO and top managers will be important in 
determining what actions will and will not be taken.  Becker (1964) categorized human 
capital as firm-specific or general in nature.  Firm specific knowledge is regarded as 
operational or functional knowledge that has limited or no value outside of the firm, 
while general knowledge is applicable to various settings across firms.  In terms of 
corporations, firm specific knowledge is analogous to knowledge of operations or 
specialized resource allocation procedures unique to the firm while general knowledge is 
analogous to corporate knowledge (e.g., the general management of tools and 
techniques, interfacing with external constituencies, etc.). 
The formation of top management in spin-offs has drawn the attention of Wruck 
and Wruck (2002) as well as commentary by Hambrick and Stucker (1999).  Wruck and 
Wruck (2002) categorize the potential candidates for top management posts as to their 
origin, with three categories offered: insider divisional, insider corporate, and outsider.  
Insider divisional top managers represent those who managed the subsidiary prior to 
spin-off.  These individuals have very specific knowledge of their divisions (Kotter, 
1982) that has been honed over their tenure in the divisional manager position (Gabarro, 
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1987).  Additionally, these individuals are knowledgeable as to the corporate policies for 
budgeting and resource allocation, as well as the political aspects of navigating a 
corporate structure.  Aron (1991) regards these individuals as having the best operational 
knowledge of the subsidiaries’ abilities and opportunities.  It is important to note that in 
their role as divisional managers, these individuals generally have little or no contact 
with external corporate constituencies (e.g., shareholders, analysts, investor groups), but 
rather focus on directing their respective divisions.  Moreover, insider divisional 
managers generally have limited experience with financial market issues given that their 
divisional operations are funded through internal capital markets.    
Second, insider corporate top managers are individuals within the corporate 
structure of the parent organization (e.g., CEO, CFO, COO, Comptroller, etc.).  
Following Becker (1964) and Wruck and Wruck (2002), it is argued that these 
individuals generally have both firm-specific and general knowledge.  Their firm-
specific knowledge is generated through interaction with the particular business units, 
through which corporate managers gain a deeper understanding of the products or 
services of each of the business units of the firm.  This is essential to the formulation of a 
coherent corporate strategy with fit among the business units (Porter, 1987, 1996).  
These individuals also possess general knowledge of such things as capital management, 
investor relations, and governance that is transferable to other corporate settings.   
Finally, outsider top managers are individuals with no or short tenure with the 
firm.  The knowledge of these individuals is general in nature.  This does not imply that  
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they could not have industry-specific knowledge, as many outsiders come from other 
firms within a given industry, but rather that the knowledge possessed by the individual 
is not firm-specific in nature (see Kotter, 1982).   Although these outsiders may formerly 
have been divisional managers in their prior firms, it is much more likely that if an 
outsider manager is selected, the outsider will have general knowledge of corporate 
management (i.e., governance, capital management, shareholder relations), and even 
more likely that the outsider will have prior experience as a CEO (Westphal & Zajac, 
1997).  In addition to their general knowledge, outsiders have no commitment to existing 
hierarchies, routines, relationships, etc., and thus will feel little obligation to preserve 
them (Rousseau, 1995).  Hence, top management may come from the division, from the 
corporate level, or from outside the firm (Wruck & Wruck, 2002).   
In assessing what actions top management will take, an upper echelons 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) perspective is applied that assesses the human capital of the 
CEO and the top management group.  In other words, the past experiences and 
knowledge of the spin-off’s CEO and top management are critical in determining what 
actions will be taken.  The CEO and top management group are considered separately 
for several reasons.  First, the CEO is generally dominant in determining what action the 
firm takes (Barnard, 1942; Selznick, 1957).  While top managers and others may provide 
opinions and insights into the pursuit of an opportunity or the mitigation of a threat, the 
CEO is generally the one who makes the final decision as to whether action occurs.  
Second, the CEO is the most visible leader of the firm, to both internal and external 
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audiences, and is generally held accountable for both positive and negative 
organizational outcomes (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987; Sutton & Callahan, 1987).    
In contrast to the CEO, top management is generally viewed as a group or team 
rather than as individuals (Hambrick, 1994).  Despite this view, top managers provide an 
important advisory function to the CEO and direct their specific domains (e.g., finance, 
operations, etc.).   Additionally, top managers often form dominant coalitions (Cyert & 
March, 1963) that may become quite powerful.  It is argued that in their advisory role, 
top managers will provide insights and warnings to the CEO framed by their own 
experiences (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Ocasio, 1997), thus making the composition of 
top management an important factor in determining what actions are taken (Hambrick, 
Cho, & Chen, 1996; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).  This is especially the case where top 
managers provide human capital that complements or extends the human capital of the 
CEO.  In other words, the combination of the human capital of the CEO and top 
management will play an important role in determining what post spin-off actions are 
taken.   
In building a model of top management action, it is argued that the prior position 
of the CEO and other top managers will be important in determining what actions are 
taken.  Three categories have been previously defined, namely strategic, financial, and 
institutional.  In considering the human capital of each of the possible prior positions 
proposed by Wruck and Wruck (2002) of insider divisional, insider corporate, and 
outsider, it is argued that CEOs or top managers that were insider divisional managers 
will emphasize strategic actions, CEOs or top managers that were insider corporate 
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managers will emphasize strategic and financial actions, and CEOs or top managers that 
were outsiders will emphasize financial, institutional, or strategic actions.  It is important 
to note that ostensibly all managers are in the same “season” of their tenure with the 
spin-off (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991), which would place spin-off CEOs and top 
managers in a similar temporal mindset, focused on their “response to mandate”.  A 
caveat to this assertion may arise when those who were involved with the management 
of the subsidiary are selected to manage the spin-off.  When this occurs, the individuals 
selected may view themselves as being in a season other than “response to mandate” 
(e.g., experimentation, selection of an enduring theme, convergence).  If this is the case, 
there may be a difference in the actions taken, including the possibility that no 
significant action will be taken by these managers (e.g., the “convergence” season).    
Insider Divisional.  Former insider divisional managers will be most acquainted 
with the operational functioning of the spin-off, and therefore will focus on strategic 
actions.  Actions of this type would include such things as changes in assets, related or 
vertical integration acquisitions and divestitures, related or vertical integration joint 
ventures or strategic alliances, or labor changes – the actions about which insider 
divisional managers will be most knowledgeable.  Former insider divisional managers 
will have had limited experience with capital markets, with managing external 
constituencies, or with symbolic issues such as the selection of professional advisors, 
and thus are unlikely to engage in financial or institutional actions.    
Insider Corporate.  Former insider corporate managers will be most acquainted 
with governance and capital issues, but will have some knowledge of the operational 
  
 
56
aspects of the divisions of the corporation.  It is argued that this will cause them to focus 
primarily on financial (i.e., changes in such things as firm debt, equity, unrelated 
diversification or dividend policy) as well as strategic actions.  Additionally, it is argued 
that former insider corporate managers will be less likely to engage in institutional 
changes if they have had a role in shaping the institutional environment of the parent 
firm.  This is particularly the case if the insider corporate manager selected to manage 
the spin-off was the CEO of the parent firm.  It is argued that these individuals would 
see institutional actions as largely unnecessary.  On the other hand, less senior insider 
corporate managers may view institutional change as necessary to distinguish the spin-
off from its former parent and would thus be more likely to engage in institutional 
actions.    
Outsiders.  Outsiders will be most acquainted with governance and capital 
issues, will have no ties to the past institutional environment, and will have no firm-
specific operational knowledge.  As such, it is proposed that they will focus primarily on 
institutional and financial actions.  Institutional actions would include changes in such 
things as the external auditor, the external counsel, the stock transfer firm, the financial 
institution from that used by the parent firm to a new firm, or the spin-off’s name.  The 
rationale for this is that outsiders have no ties to the institutional environment of the 
parent firm and therefore would have no emotional or cognitive commitment to 
maintaining it, increasing the likelihood of its change.  Additionally, outsiders likely 
have incentives to establish the spin-off as an independent firm with an identity separate 
from the parent given that they were not present when the firm was a subsidiary of the 
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parent.  They may also consider the former institutional environment as a threat to the 
independence and even viability of the spin-off, and thus will be motivated to change it.  
In addition to institutional actions, outsiders generally come to the firm with a general 
knowledge of management and governance issues and will thus focus their attention at 
the corporate level on financial actions.  It is argued that in addition to institutional and 
financial actions, outsiders will engage in strategic actions, but will focus primarily on 
actions at the corporate rather than the operational level.  Finally, the strategic actions 
taken by outsiders will be more financially than operationally motivated.  For example, 
with little or no attachment to and limited psychological contracts with the workforce of 
the spin-off (Rousseau, 1995), it is plausible that outsiders are more likely to engage in 
firings and layoffs than either insider divisional or insider corporate managers, but these 
actions will be less operationally than financially motivated.   
In summary, it is argued that the background of the CEO and top managers of the 
spin-off firm will have a significant impact on the actions taken post spin-off.  It should 
not be inferred from the prior discussion that the CEO or top managers will not ever take 
actions not specified (e.g., insider divisional manager undertaking institutional actions), 
but rather that given the backgrounds of the various managers human capital theory 
(Becker, 1964) provides insight into what actions are most likely to be taken.  
Consequently, the following hypotheses are offered.   
H1. The selection of the spin-off CEO will affect managerial action, with  
(a) The selection of an insider divisional manager as CEO increasing the 
likelihood of strategic management actions;  
(b) The selection of an insider corporate manager CEO increasing the likelihood 
of financial and strategic management actions; and  
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(c) The selection of an outsider as CEO increasing the likelihood of institutional, 
financial, and strategic management actions. 
H2. The composition of spin-off top management will affect managerial action, with  
(a) Insider divisional dominated top management increasing the likelihood of 
strategic management actions;  
(b) Insider corporate dominated top management increasing the likelihood of 
financial and strategic management actions; and  
(c) Outsider dominated top management increasing the likelihood of 
institutional, financial, and strategic management actions. 
Agency Theory 
Incentives.  In addition to the formation of new executives in the spin-off’s upper 
echelon, agency theory proposes that a spin-off presents the opportunity for 
implementing incentive contracts tied to market performance.  The implementation of 
such contracts increases the alignment of interests between principals and agents (Fama, 
1980).  This is not to say that incentive contracts are not possible under the corporate 
structure (e.g., incentive contracts based upon return on assets), but rather that division-
level stock performance contracts are difficult given that a corporation’s stock is a noisy 
signal of a division’s actual performance (Aron, 1991).  Seward and Walsh (1996) found 
that firms often take the spin-off opportunity to issue incentive-based contracts to their 
top managers, with almost two thirds utilizing performance-contingent contracts as a 
part of top manager compensation.  In addition to their compensation contracts, top 
managers are often offered significant ownership stakes in the newly formed entity.  
Ownership of this nature is efficient from an agency perspective (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; McConnell & Servaes, 1990).  As Hambrick and Stucker state, “whereas an 
executive at the parent firm might have owned twenty thousand shares and felt no 
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impact on the organization, that same manager in a spin-off would own more than 1 
percent and know that he was making a big difference” (1999: 112).   
Having established the importance of incentive-based contracts and management 
ownership, the focus now turns to their influence on managerial action.  With a greater 
stake in the success of the spun-off firm, it is proposed that both incentive-based 
contracts and higher levels of management ownership will increase the likelihood of 
strategic and financial managerial actions since they can directly influence the 
performance measures of the firm, providing management with the ability to benefit 
from the actions they take.  This contrasts with institutional actions, which are more 
symbolic and are harder to translate into performance.  Thus, in the presence of 
incentive-based contracts and higher managerial ownership, managers are more likely to 
take actions that may result in positive performance for the firm and improved fortunes 
for them.  In other words, by increasing the ability of management to profit from action, 
it becomes more likely that top managers will take actions that will provide financial 
benefit to them.  This supports the following hypotheses:  
H3. Incentive-based management employment contracts will increase the likelihood 
of strategic and financial management actions. 
H4. Higher levels of management ownership will increase the likelihood of strategic 
and financial management actions. 
Monitoring.  Concomitant with becoming a separate, publicly traded entity is the 
formation of a board of directors for the spin-off who will provide for the monitoring of 
agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  While much has been written on the role of 
corporate boards (e.g., Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Westphal, 1998, 1999), examination of 
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the board structure of spin-off firms warrants particular attention.  For example, Seward 
and Walsh (1996) found that outsiders outnumbered insiders on the boards of spun-off 
firms, indicating that at spin-off improved monitoring is often established.  Additionally, 
Wruck and Wruck (2002) found that the chairman from the former parent chaired 33 
percent of the boards where the chairman and CEO positions were separate.  
Furthermore, the parent firm may retain ownership of up to 20 percent of the stock of the 
spin-off (Miles & Woolridge, 1999), providing it a seat on the board of directors, as was 
the case with Cytec Industries which was spun-off by American Cyanamid.   
It is proposed that ownership or monitoring control of the spin-off by the former 
corporate parent will dampen the newfound discretion of the spin-off’s top management 
and that this will be evident in limited managerial action taken by the spin-off’s top 
management when executives from the parent firm occupy seats on the spin-off’s board 
or the parent corporation retains a large ownership stake.  Under the monitoring of the 
former parent, it is argued that spin-offs will be much more likely to follow the path they 
pursued as a subsidiary of the parent.  In other words, although the spin-off has its 
independence, its top management will be constrained by the tie to its former corporate 
parent and this will decrease the likelihood that action will occur.  Hence, when the 
former parent holds a monitoring role over the spun-off firm, top management discretion 
will be reduced, weakening the relationship between the spin-off’s top management 
background and the types of actions that could be taken post spin-off.   
In examining the monitoring relationship, it is proposed that higher levels of parent-
corporation ownership as well as having a chairman or board members from the former 
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parent will decrease the likelihood of managerial action.  In the presence of parent 
ownership and monitoring, spin-off managers are less likely to take actions due to the 
association with the former parent.  In other words, the closer the ties between the 
corporate parent and the spin-off firm, the less likely it is that top managers will take 
action.   
H5. Higher levels of corporate parent ownership will decrease the likelihood of 
strategic, financial, and institutional management actions. 
H6. Having  a chairman from the parent firm will decrease the likelihood of 
strategic, financial, and institutional management actions. 
H7. Higher representation of board members from the parent firm on the spin-off’s 
board will decrease the likelihood of strategic, financial, and institutional 
management actions. 
Transaction Cost Economics  
Severance Effects.  In addition to the formation of top management and monitoring 
and incentive changes, the spin-off will experience severance effects by leaving the 
diversified structure of the parent corporation.  Much theory and research exists 
surrounding the benefits and liabilities of the diversified firm structure, much of it from 
the transaction cost perspective (Rumelt, 1974; Teece, 1980; Williamson, 1975).  
Additionally, theory and research exists surrounding the downscoping of the firm from 
the parent’s perspective (e.g., Gilson, 2001; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994).  However, 
relatively little theory or research exists surrounding the effects of a subsidiary leaving 
the diversified structure of the parent firm to become a stand-alone entity as is the case 
in spin-offs.  The event, while potentially providing increased managerial discretion, has 
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serious implications for the losses of economies enjoyed under the diversified structure 
of the parent firm.   
Applying the transaction cost arguments of Jones and Hill (1988) described 
earlier in this chapter, the largest losses of economies (e.g., scope, integration, and 
internal capital markets) will be suffered by spin-offs that were related to their former 
parents, that the next heaviest losses will be incurred by spin-off firms that were 
vertically integrated firms within their parents’ corporate structures, and that the least 
losses of economies will be suffered by spin-offs that were unrelated to their former 
parents.  It must be noted that although the spin-off firms may suffer losses of 
economies, they will also enjoy gains from decreased bureaucratic costs (Jones & Hill, 
1988) and increased managerial discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).   Indeed, 
several have suggested that a dominant logic for spin-offs is the removal of negative 
synergies between the parent and the subsidiary (Hite & Owners, 1983; Schipper & 
Smith, 1983).  But, regardless of the removal of negative synergies or bureaucratic 
efficiency gains, a spin-off must replace much of what is lost from leaving the corporate 
structure.  For example, the spin-off will no longer be able to use the factories, fleet, 
office space, etc. of the parent organization, requiring strategic actions to replace these 
losses.  Similarly, the spin-off must compensate for the loss of corporate human capital 
resources, particularly human resources at the parent’s the corporate level (e.g., human 
resources, MIS, etc.).  Moreover, a spin-off must establish itself in the capital markets, 
using debt and equity means to finance its operations rather than the internal capital 
markets of the parent, necessitating financial actions.  Loss of internal capital markets 
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may also seriously affect the strategic flexibility of the spin-off in taking other strategic 
actions (Harrigan, 1985).  Moreover, a spin-off that was relatedly diversified to its 
former parent must often establish itself in the external environment as a separate entity 
independent of the former parent corporation, requiring institutional actions.  This is 
often done through the establishment of the spin-offs’ own branding and corporate 
identity.   
In addition to the loss of economies from leaving the diversified structure, the 
spun-off firm must now negotiate its own contracts with buyers and suppliers.  Contract 
renegotiation under these conditions could be either a benefit or a burden (Schipper & 
Smith, 1983).  Although gains can be made by having increased contractual freedom or 
by renegotiating contracts with unfavorable terms, spin-offs may find it more difficult to 
obtain favorable terms with suppliers given their smaller size relative to when they were 
part of the parent corporation.  In other words, suppliers may be less inclined to provide 
favorable terms when dealing with a smaller entity such as a spin-off.  Similarly, buyers 
may be able to extract better terms from the spin-off given that they are now an 
independent, stand-alone entity.  Additionally, without the cross-subsidies often 
provided by internal capital markets (Scharfstein & Stein, 1997), spin-off firms will be 
more susceptible to fluctuations in buyer demand, making them vulnerable to the loss of 
a major supplier or customer.  Thus, although some benefits may accrue from contract 
renegotiations, there may be drawbacks as well depending on the circumstances 
surrounding the renegotiation. 
  
 
64
The proceeding discussion highlights that all spin-offs are likely to experience 
severance effects from their exit from the diversified structure of the parent firm, some 
negative (e.g., loss of economies) and some positive (e.g., decreased bureaucratic costs 
and increased discretion).  In examining the severance effects sustained by the spin-off, 
it is likely that the diversification relationship between the spin-off and its former parent 
will affect the likelihood of managerial action.  This is because as managers consider 
taking actions, they will take into account the severance effects accompanying their exit 
from the parent corporation.  More specifically, each of the three relationship types 
(unrelated, vertically integrated and related) highlight specific categories of action that 
will be most salient to top managers as they consider what actions to take.  For example, 
when the spin-off is unrelated to its parent, managers are likely to take financial actions 
to address the loss of economies of internal capital markets, whereas when the spin-off 
was related to its parent, managers are likely to take financial, strategic, and institutional 
actions to address the loss of economies of scope, integration, and internal capital 
markets, as well as to establish the spin-off as an entity independent of the parent 
organization.  In sum, the relationship between the parent and the spin-off will influence 
the relationship between top management and action, supporting the following 
hypothesis.   
H8. The diversification relationship between the spin-off and its former parent will 
affect top management actions, with 
(a) Unrelatedly diversified relationships increasing the likelihood of financial 
management actions;  
(b) Vertically integrated relationships increasing the likelihood of financial and 
strategic management actions; and,  
  
 
65
(c) Relatedly diversified relationships increasing the likelihood of financial, 
strategic, and institutional management actions. 
Spin-Off Performance 
The focus now turns from actions to the performance implications of those 
actions.  Barney describes the construct of performance as multifaceted, with 
measurement issues often being problematic (2002: Chapter II).  He outlines three broad 
categories of performance measurement: firm survival, stakeholder approaches, and 
accounting approaches, each with strengths and weaknesses.  While firm survival is an 
important performance measure in many settings, particularly population ecology (see 
Hannan & Freeman, 1989), it lacks the detail necessary for a deeper understanding of 
spin-off performance.  In other words, a firm may survive but survival alone does not 
suggest positive performance, only that the firm has performed sufficiently to persist in 
the market, making survival a low performance threshold.  In contrast, stakeholder and 
accounting approaches offer more detailed information on firm performance, albeit from 
different perspectives.  Stakeholder approaches generally deal with financial markets 
while accounting approaches deal with financial or operational aspects of managing the 
firm.  In the subsequent theory section, hypotheses are developed according to financial 
market and accounting perspectives, as well as joining the two perspectives in hybrid 
measures such as market-to-book ratios.  
Market Mandate. As was discussed previously, corporate spin-off provides an 
implicit mandate for top managers to take action.  Indeed, the opportunity presented by 
the debut has been characterized by some as “entrepreneurial” in nature (Hambrick & 
Stucker, 1999), with top managers essentially unbridled or unleashed from their former 
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corporate moorings and anxious to take advantage of their newfound discretion (see 
Wruck & Roper, 1997).  In addition, top management may have monetary incentives to 
act (Aron, 1991), as well as monitoring in place to ensure that managers are performing 
their duties effectively (Demb & Neubauer, 1992).  Furthermore, there are substantial 
risks to maintaining an inertial course due to the losses of economies and relationship 
changes that inevitably occur post debut.  Finally, as Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) 
suggest, spin-off CEOs (and by extension top management) are ostensibly in the 
“response to mandate” season of their tenure, making top management action more 
likely.4   
It is therefore argued that managers have ample motive to act and that a lack of 
action by top management in a spin-off situation will be marked by negative 
performance results.  Making this assertion does not imply that any action taken will 
yield positive results, but rather it suggests that there is an overall bias for action by top 
management.  Gabarro (1987) found that new general managers were generally action-
oriented, and that actions were positively related with performance.  Thus, it is argued 
that the spin-off of a firm is a call to action for the top management of the spin-off, and 
that failing to answer this call with action will be met with negative performance results.   
H9. For spin-off firms, top management inaction will lead to lower performance.   
Severance Effects.  Although it has been proposed that spin-offs create an 
overall bias for action by top management, it is recognized that some actions will be 
                                                 
4 If insider division managers are selected to head the spin-off it is conceivable that they may view 
themselves in a season other than “response to mandate” (e.g., experimentation, selection of an enduring 
theme, convergence).  
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more efficacious in generating positive performance than others.  In this vein, it is 
argued that the losses of economies due to exit from the diversified corporate structure 
will have a substantial impact on performance.  Foundation for this assertion comes from 
transaction cost logic that has been used to examine multi-product (Teece, 1980, 1982) 
or vertically integrated firms (Williamson, 1975).  Jones and Hill (1988) discuss these 
economies as being of internal capital markets (unrelated strategy), of integration 
(vertical integration), and of scope (related strategy), with a nesting effect according to 
the level of interdependence that has been described earlier in this chapter.   
Accordingly, spin-offs that are related to their former parent will suffer the largest losses 
in economies, followed by formerly vertically integrated spin-offs and spin-offs that are 
unrelated to their former parent.   
From a performance standpoint, it is argued that managerial actions to address 
losses of economies will yield positive performance results.  In other words, actions 
taken to replace what was lost in the severance from the corporate parent will have 
favorable market implications.  For example, financial actions taken by a spin-off that 
was unrelated to its former parent will yield positive performance results.  This is 
because the replacement of the loss of internal capital market economies it enjoyed 
under its former corporate structure is essential.  Likewise, strategic and financial actions 
taken by a spin-off that was vertically integrated with its former parent will yield 
positive performance results.  Vertically integrated firms will need to replace not only 
the loss of internal capital markets but also structural elements (e.g., plant and 
equipment) that were lost with the exit from the corporate structure.  Finally, for a spin-
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off that was related to its former parent, all three types of actions (strategic, financial, 
and institutional) will yield positive performance results.  The spin-offs must not only 
replace what was lost structurally and financially (as with unrelated and vertically 
integrated spin-offs), but also must establish themselves as independent entities through 
institutional actions that differentiate the spin-off from its former parent.  Spin-offs that 
were related to their former parent were the most tightly integrated and aligned to them, 
and thus must take the most action to establish themselves as successful independent 
firms.  It is important to note that managerial actions are not costless and initial 
accounting performance may suffer due to replacement costs, as was noted by Woo and 
colleagues (1992).  However, over the longer term, these actions will yield greater 
operational efficiency as well as greater discretion, both of which will yield positive 
performance results.   
A moderating relationship is thus proposed where the type of relationship 
between the spin-off and its corporate parent positively affects the relationship between 
actions taken by top management and spin-off performance.   In other words, when the 
actions taken address severance losses, the effect on performance will be more positive 
than it is otherwise.  This yields the following hypothesis. 
H10. Spin-off performance will be affected by managerial actions according to the 
corporate relationship with the former parent, with  
(a) Financial actions by top management positively affecting spin-off 
performance when the spin-off was unrelated to its former parent;  
(b) Financial and strategic actions by top management positively affecting spin-
off performance when the spin-off was vertically linked with its former parent; 
and  
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(c) Financial, strategic, and institutional actions by top management positively 
affecting spin-off performance when the spin-off was related to its former parent. 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide theoretical development for the 
hypotheses that have been presented.  The chapter began with an examination of three 
categories of managerial actions, namely strategic actions, financial actions, and 
institutional actions.  This was followed by a discussion of motivations for managerial 
actions, which in turn was followed by a discussion of several factors that might hinder 
the taking of managerial actions.  The focus of the chapter then turned to the theoretical 
development of a model of top management action by spin-off firms.  The theoretical 
development centered on the integration of upper echelons theory, agency theory, and 
transaction cost economics.  The relationship between managerial actions and 
performance was also developed.   
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CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this section is to provide a description of how the hypothesized 
relationships found in Chapter IV are empirically tested.  The chapter will begin with a 
discussion of the sample, followed by a description of the measures and measurement 
issues.  The chapter will close with a discussion of the statistical methods that will be 
used to test the hypotheses.   
SAMPLE 
The base sample for this research includes all spin-offs announced by companies 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) or 
the NASDAQ between 1986 and 1997.  There are several reasons for selecting a sample 
of this type.  First, the dynamics described in the proposed theoretical model (e.g., 
monitoring and incentives, severance effects, etc.) best correspond to large, publicly 
traded firms, such as those listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ.  Second, research 
to date on spin-offs has used similar samples, increasing the comparability of this 
research with previous studies.  Third, the sample period (1986 – 1997) covers periods 
of economic decline as well as economic growth, thereby increasing the generalizablity 
of the research.  Finally, the data for a sample of this type is publicly available from 
archival sources, enabling the collection of the data necessary to empirically test the 
hypothesized relationships.    
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The initial sample was identified through two primary sources.  First, spin-offs 
are considered a special form of dividend, and dividend payments to shareholders are 
tracked in the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) tapes.   Second, the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database provides 
information on corporate spin-offs.  The information from these two data sources was 
combined to form the base sample.  From this base sample, spin-off announcement and 
completion dates were identified from data sources such as the Wall Street Journal, 
Lexis/Nexis, and Commerce Clearing House (CCH) Capital Changes Reporter.   
To be included in the sample, the spin-off must comply with several conditions.  
First, announcement and completion dates must be certain.  This condition ensures that 
only actual spin-offs are included in the sample (Seward & Walsh, 1996) and is 
necessary to correctly set the observation windows.  Second, the parent firm must spin-
off at least 80 percent of the spin-off firm.  This condition increases the independence of 
the spin-off from the parent firm (Gilson, 2001) and improves the homogeneity of the 
context for the sample population.  Third, the spin-off must be voluntary rather than 
compelled by government regulation or judicial ruling.  Compelled spin-offs often have 
different contexts, motivations, and performance implications (Boudreaux, 1975; Kudla 
& McInish, 1981), so excluding these firms increases the internal validity of the 
empirical results.  Finally, the spin-off and parent firm must both be listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or the NASDAQ and proxy 
statement information must exist for both firms.  Up to a five-year panel of data is 
collected for each spin-off meeting these four criteria, with the firm-year being the unit 
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of analysis for the study.  During the study window it is possible that firms may exit 
because of bankruptcy or acquisition, and this will reduce the number of firm-year 
observations. 
MEASURES 
The empirical analysis is divided into two sets of models.  The first set of models 
deals with top management actions while the second set deals with performance 
outcomes.  The two sets of models are described separately below. 
Managerial Actions 
The proposed theoretical model states that top management background, 
severance effects, and monitoring and incentives will all affect what actions are taken 
post spin-off.  From the discussion in Chapter IV, top management actions are 
conceptualized as being strategic, financial, or institutional in nature.  Each of these 
categories of actions will be treated in turn.  Because of the heterogeneous nature of the 
actions that are categorized as strategic, financial, or institutional, this research follows a 
methodology similar to that of Gabarro (1987) and Virany and colleagues (Virany, 
Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992).  In dealing with personnel actions, Gabarro counted the 
number of actions taken by a given manager for the given time period.  For strategic 
actions, he categorized actions as to the type of subunit that they affected, using three 
categories of minor subunit (e.g., personnel, MIS), major functional subunit (e.g., 
manufacturing, sales, engineering), and major product subunit (e.g., product divisions or 
product groups).   He gave an action in a minor subunit a value of one unit, an action in a 
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major functional subunit a value of two units, and an action in a major product subunit a 
value of three units.  The number of strategic action units were then summed for the 
given time period.   
Virany and colleagues (1992) applied a slightly different approach in their 
assessment of reorientations of firms in turbulent environments.  They examined change 
over a number of dimensions (e.g., strategy, structure, control practices).  Thresholds 
were set in each of the areas for what degree of change constituted a strategy, structural, 
or control practice change.  After assessing the degree of change in each of these areas, 
Virany and colleagues determined that if change had been initiated in each of the areas 
during a two-year window, this constituted a reorientation and accordingly coded the 
reorientation to one; otherwise, the variable was coded to zero.   
This research will more closely follow the work of Gabarro (1987) than Virany 
and colleagues (1992) by summing the strategic actions in a given year rather than 
dichotomously coding if significant action has occurred.  This will provide a more fine-
grained approach to modeling spin-off actions by assessing the level of action through a 
discrete count dependent variable rather than simply the occurrence of action in a 
dichotomous dependent variable. 
Dependent Variable – Strategic Actions.  Strategic actions are actions that 
affect the operations or infrastructure of the organization.  These actions are generally 
taken to improve operational or organizational efficiency and usually require knowledge 
of the operations of the organization in order to be effectively executed.  Actions of this 
category will be operationalized as follows.  First, changes in resources are identified by 
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examining changes in assets for the spin-off in the given period.  Second, labor actions 
are identified by changes in the number of employees reported in a given period.  For 
both asset and labor changes, significant changes are determined by generating the 
studentized residuals for the predicted values (Hamilton, 1992) after regressing the 
current year value on the prior year value (see Bergh & Fairbank, 2002).  The 
studentized residual is a t score and all residuals over 1.96 will be considered 
significantly different than the predicted value and will be coded as a strategic action.5  
Third, related and vertical integration acquisitions are identified from the SDC mergers 
and acquisitions database as well as the Wall Street Journal.   While it might be argued 
that a high correlation should exist between changes in assets and acquisitions, in 
actuality the correlation between them is quite small (less than .05) and not significant.  
Fourth, divestitures are identified from the SDC mergers and acquisitions database as 
well as the Wall Street Journal.   Fifth, diversification changes are assessed as additions 
or deletions of four-digit SIC codes.  Finally, major organizational restructurings are 
identified by examining the annual letter to shareholders filed with the proxy statement.    
The correlations between these measures are reported in Table 1a.  Not surprisingly asset 
changes are significantly correlated with employee changes (0.326) as well as 
diversification additions (0.087) and diversification deletions (-0.09), and diversification 
additions and deletions are negatively correlated (-0.188), but none of the correlations 
are high enough to indicate significant overlap.  If significant change occurs in each area 
                                                 
5 A more detailed discussion of this method is found in Appendix C. 
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then the variable for that area is coded as a one; otherwise it is coded zero.  All of these 
actions are then summed together to produce a final strategic action count for each firm 
year. 
Dependent Variable – Financial Actions.  Financial actions are defined as 
actions affecting the capital structure of the organization.  These actions are taken to 
improve the financial position of the firm, to provide the capital resources to embark 
upon new strategies, or to assuage financial burdens.  Actions of this category are 
operationalized as follows.  First, changes in the spin-off’s debt structure are assessed.  
Second, changes in the spin-off’s equity structure are assessed.  The method of 
determining significant change for debt and equity changes is the same as that described 
for asset and employee changes for strategic actions, namely through the use of 
studentized residuals.6  Third, if the firm changed the amount it paid to shareholders in 
dividends, a change in dividend policy was recorded.   Fifth, unrelatedly diversified 
acquisitions are identified from the SDC mergers and acquisitions database as well as the 
Wall Street Journal.   The correlations between these measures are reported in Table 1b, 
with no significant correlations.  If significant change occurs in each area then the 
variable for that area is coded as a one; otherwise it is coded zero.  All of these actions 
are then summed together to produce a final financial action count for each firm year. 
Dependent Variable – Institutional Actions.  Institutional actions are defined 
as actions that seek to establish the spin-off as an independent entity apart from the 
                                                 
6 A detailed discussion of this method is found in Appendix C. 
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parent firm.  Actions of this category will be operationalized as follows.  First, changing 
the external auditor (controlling for merger and acquisition activity among the major 
accounting firms) will be counted as an institutional action.  Second, changing the 
external counsel will be counted as an institutional action.  Third, changing the stock 
transfer firm will be counted as an institutional action.  Fourth, changes to the spin-off’s 
name will be counted as an institutional action.   
Finally, the shareholder letters and management discussion for each firm for each 
year are assessed for changes in tone.  The tone that a company sets sends a signal to 
various interested parties (i.e., shareholders, customers, suppliers, competitors) regarding 
the firm’s intentions.  Researchers have noted that much of management is symbolic (see 
Pfeffer, 1981; Smircich & Morgan, 1982) and changes in the tone of statements issued 
by the firm generally portend changes in the focus or intent of the firm and as such 
constitute a significant institutional signal.   
Changes in tone are measured along five key dimensions (certainty, activity, 
optimism, commonality, or realism).  This measurement is done using the text analysis 
software Diction 5.0 (Hart, 2000). 7  The Diction software has established tolerances for 
the scores of these key dimensions by examining the language used in a random sample 
of corporate financial reports.  These tolerances are upper and lower bounds for the 
given variable, with any score outside these bounds considered “out of range”.  Both the 
shareholder letter and the management discussion were assessed using the software, with 
                                                 
7 A detailed discussion of how Diction 5.0 calculates its variables is found in Appendix D. 
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shareholder letters or management discussions registering scores outside the tolerances 
for the five key dimensions recorded.  Changes are assessed by comparing the scores for 
the shareholder letters and the management discussion of a given year to the year that 
preceded it.  For example, if a shareholder letter had out of range scores on certainty and 
optimism in yeart and the shareholder letter had out of range scores for certainty and 
realism in yeart+1, an institutional action would be recorded; however, if the out of range 
scores are similar from one year to the next, or of there are no out of range scores from 
one year to the next, no institutional action is recorded.   
The correlations between these measures are reported in Table 1c.  Not 
surprisingly, changes in rhetoric in the shareholder letters is significantly correlated with 
changes in rhetoric in the management discussion (0.401); more surprising is the 
significant correlation between change in counsel and change in stock transfer firm 
(0.727).  While this correlation is high, these decisions are independent and therefore do 
not significantly overlap other than that perhaps firms make financial and legal changes 
simultaneously.  If significant change occurs in each area then the variable for that area 
is coded as a one; otherwise it is coded zero.  All of these actions are then summed 
together to produce a final institutional action count for each firm year. 
Top Management Background.  For this research, top management background 
focuses on the prior position of the top managers before joining the spin-off firm.  Top 
managers are characterized as being insider divisional, insider corporate, or outsider, 
following the categorization used by Wruck and Wruck (2002).  Prior position of the top 
managers is assessed by examining the corporate histories of the parent firms and the 
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spin-off firms, the listing of senior officers for the parent firm in Compact Disclosure, 
the Dun & Bradstreet corporate officer listing, and the annual report of the spin-off 
firms. 
To model management composition, three dummy variables will be established: 
insider divisional, insider corporate, and outsider.  The divisional insider variable will be 
set to 1 if the CEO was previously in a position at the division level of the parent firm 
and zero otherwise.   The insider corporate variable will be set to 1 if the CEO was 
previously in a position at the corporate level of the parent firm and zero otherwise.   
The outsider variable will be set to 1 if the CEO was previously in a position outside of 
the parent firm and zero otherwise.   For the regression models, outsider CEO is the 
omitted category.  The top management dominant variables are handled in a like fashion, 
with three variables established: insider divisional, insider corporate top management, 
and outsider top management.  Domination of top management is a simple majority in 
the top management group (i.e., 50 percent or more) which is made up of the Chairman 
of the Board, the President, the CFO, and the COO, and excluding the CEO.  The insider 
divisional top management variable is set to 1 if the top management is dominated by 
officers that were previously in a position at the divisional level of the parent firm and 
zero otherwise.   The insider corporate top management variable is set to 1 if the top 
management is dominated by officers that were previously in a position at the corporate 
level of the parent firm and zero otherwise.   The outsider top management variable is set 
to 1 if the top management is dominated by officers that were previously in a position 
outside the parent firm and zero otherwise.  The omitted category for the regression 
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models is no TMT domination (i.e., the simple majority is not held by any of the three 
groups).   
Severance Effects.  For this research the severance effects are characterized by 
the relationship between the parent company and the spin-off.  This relationship was 
established by expert raters who classified the relationships between the parent and spin-
off firm according to business descriptions, SIC codes, and buyer/supplier relationships.  
Three variables for severance effects are established: unrelated (in a different industry 
than the parent and not a buyer or supplier to the parent), vertically integrated (e.g., 
buyer or supplier to the parent), and related (in the same industry as the parent).  The 
unrelated variable is set to one if the relationship is determined to be unrelated and zero 
otherwise.  The vertically integrated variable is set to one if the relationship is 
determined to be vertically integrated and zero otherwise.  The related variable is set to 
one if the relationship is determined to be related and zero otherwise.  Initial inter-rater 
reliability for generating this variable is .75, with the discrepancies resolved by mutual 
agreement.  The omitted category for the regression models is firms that are unrelated to 
their former corporate parent. 
Monitoring.  Two monitoring variables are important for this research.  First, 
proxy statements were examined to determine if the chairman of the board is affiliated 
with the parent firm (i.e., CEO of the parent, top manager, etc.).  The chairman of the 
board variable is coded one if this is the case and zero if it is not.  Second, the board of 
directors listed in the proxy statement for the spin-off was examined to determine if the 
parent organization has retained any seats on the board.   If the parent organization has 
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retained seats on the board other than the chairman of the board, the value of board of 
directors is coded as one and zero otherwise.  Thus, if the chairman of the board is the 
only member of the board from the parent firm, the chairman of the board variable is set 
to one and the board of directors variable is set to zero.  If, however, there are members 
of the board of directors from the parent firm in addition to the chairman of the board 
from the parent firm, the chairman of the board variable and the board of directors 
variables will both be set to one.  If the chairman of the board is not from the parent firm 
but there are one or more board members from the parent firm, chairman of the board 
variable is set to zero and board of directors is set to one.  Finally, if the parent firm 
occupies no seats on the board, the values of both chairman of the board variable and 
board of directors are set to zero. 
Ownership and Incentives.  A managerial ownership variable was developed 
from information in the proxy statement that indicates the percent of ownership of top 
managers in the spin-off firm.   In addition, the ownership of the CEO is captured as well 
to provide a more fine-grained view of the effects of ownership on action.  The CEO’s 
ownership is subtracted from the TMT ownership to prevent confounded results.  Next, 
the ownership of the parent firm in the spin-off, after the spin-off event, is an important 
variable given that higher levels of ownership denote less autonomy for the spin-off.  
This variable was generated by evaluating the five percent ownership listing in the 10K 
filings and coding a dummy variable to one if the parent is a five percent (or more) 
owner in the spin-off and zero if they are not.  From the sample selection criteria it is 
important to note that the upper bound for this number is 20 percent.  Finally, incentives 
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for the CEO were initially assessed using the method applied by Seward and Walsh 
(1996); however, much of the data were unavailable from either the firm’s 10-K filing or 
other public sources, so CEO incentives were coded as a dichotomous variable 
indicating the presence of stock options (coded one) or their absence (coded zero). 
Performance 
The proposed theoretical model states that top management actions will influence 
spin-off, with severance effects having a moderating role.  Performance is a broad 
construct and has been operationalized in numerous ways (see Chapter II of Barney 
(2002) for a discussion of this topic).  For this research, performance is operationalized 
as being either market, operating, or managerial. 
Market Performance.  Market performance refers to the shareholder return.  It 
is calculated by compounding the daily returns to shareholders from the CRSP tapes 
over each fiscal year.  The CRSP tapes adjust for stock splits and dividends, so that this 
variable represents shareholder returns at the end of the fiscal year from a $1.00 
investment made on the first day of the fiscal year.   
Operating Performance. Operating performance refers to the return on total 
investment in the firm.  The most widely accepted measure of operational performance 
is return on assets (ROA), which is calculated by dividing annual income by net assets.  
This measure provides a sense of what earnings were generated from invested capital.  
Other operational measures will also be assessed such as return on sales (ROS), 
calculated by dividing net income by the sales and return on equity (ROE), calculated as 
net income divided by shareholder's equity.   
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Managerial Performance.  Managerial performance refers to the value 
generated by the management through the use of firm resources.  Tobin’s q (Tobin, 
1969) is a straightforward measure for management performance.  It is calculated as 
follows: 
AssetsTotalofCosttReplacemen
ValueMarketFirmqsTobin' =  
  Developing the numerator and denominator for this measure has been the 
subject of much debate (Perfect & Wiles, 1994), but researchers have found that simple 
calculations of this measure closely approximate much more complex measures, with the 
R2 between simple approximations of Tobin’s q and more sophisticated methods were 
never below .966 (Chung & Pruitt, 1994).  These simple approximations are, however, 
only a proxy for the true calculation for Tobin’s q.  The proxy for Tobin’s q used in this 
research is often referred to as the market-to-book ratio and is calculated as follows: 
AssetsTotalofValueBook
ValueMarketFirmBook-to-Market =  
with 
debttermlongsfirm'aofvaluebook
debttermshortsfirm'aofvaluebook
stockpreferredofvaluemarket
stockcommonofvaluemarketvaluemarketfirm
+
+
+=
 
Hence, market performance, operating performance, and managerial performance will be 
used as dependent variables to assess the efficacy of actions taken by spin-offs post 
debut.   
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Control Variables 
Several control variables are necessary for correct model specification (Greene, 
2000).  For the two sets of models there are several control variables.  First, following 
Woo and colleagues (1992), the two-digit SIC is used to control for industry effects 
(Schmalensee, 1985).  Second, the resource flexibility of the spin-off is assessed.  
Resource flexibility affects the ability of the spin-off to take actions.  Miles and 
Woolridge state, “spin-offs are often viewed as initially undercapitalized and 
overleveraged” (1999: 13).  Such an imbalance will impinge the spin-off’s ability to take 
action or to achieve performance.  To address this, the current ratio (a measure of the 
firm’s ability to cover its liabilities with assets that can readily be converted into cash) 
and the firm’s debt to asset ratio (measure of the firm’s debt structure in relation to its 
asset structure) are included.  Third, the size of the spin-off relative to the parent is used.  
Researchers have found that the size of the spin-off relative to the parent has an 
important effect on market performance (J.P. Morgan, 1995, 1999) as well as operating 
performance (Wruck & Wruck, 2002).   
Fourth, there will be a dummy variable entered for the type of spin-off.  The 
various types of spin-off are discussed in Chapter III, with the dominant reasons being 
increased focus for the parent (Daley et al., 1997; Desai & Jain, 1999; Hoskisson & Hitt, 
1994), to address problems with either the parent of the division (Gilson, 2001; Weston, 
Siu, & Johnson, 2001) or for financial reasons (DePamphilis, 2001; Miles & Woolridge, 
1999), with a base category of other for all other reasons.  The dominant reason for the 
spin-off was culled from press releases or news articles that discuss the spin-off. 
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Fifth, dummy variables are entered to control for the time periods (in years) after 
the spin-off, with the first year omitted as the base category.  It is very likely that 
strategic, financial, and institutional actions will vary over the period after the spin-off 
event, and these dummy variables will control for that variation.  Sixth, the strategic, 
financial, or institutional actions taken by the spin-off firm may be affected by CEO 
succession or changes in the top management team.  To control this a dummy variable is 
entered into the equations that is set to one if there was a CEO succession and zero if 
not.  For the top management team, a dummy variable is entered into the equations that 
is set to one if the domination of the top management team changes from one type (i.e., 
divisional, corporate, outsider) to another and zero if it does not. 
STATISTICAL METHOD 
In addition to descriptive statistics such as means, standard deviations, and 
correlations, two main statistical methods were used to test the hypotheses discussed in 
Chapter IV.  Both statistical methods are multivariate regressions with special 
adjustments due to the nature of the measures described earlier in this chapter.  The first 
statistical method is a time series cross sectional (TSCS) negative binomial regression 
(Long, 1997) while the second is a hierarchical generalized least squares (GLS) TSCS 
model (Greene, 2000; Maddala, 1992).  Both models take into account the TSCS nature 
of the data, controlling serial correlation and unobserved heterogeneity.   
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TSCS Negative Binomial Regression Modeling 
First, a random effects TSCS negative binomial model is estimated with the 
strategic action, financial action, or institutional action counts as the dependent variable 
(Long, 1997).   This modeling technique was selected because of the non-negative count 
nature of the dependent variables.  A negative binomial model is selected over a Poisson 
model to control for possible overdispersion that may occur if the conditional variance 
exceeds the conditional mean (which are assumed to be equal under the Poisson model) 
and which would yield estimates that are consistent, but not efficient (Gourieroux, 
Monfort, & Trognon, 1984).   This overdispersion is likely when there is “zero 
inflation”, which is a high number of zero observations in the count dependent variable.  
It is important to note that the negative binomial model reverts to the Poisson model if 
the conditional variance does not exceed the mean.  The model uses a random-effects 
approach that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity and assumes a normal distribution 
of the effects (Sayrs, 1989).  The format of the model (TSCS) provides controls for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in much the same way that the GLS model does 
with a continuous dependent variable (Conway, 1990).  Hence, a random effects, 
negative binomial model is used in the statistical analysis of the various categories of 
actions. 
Hierarchical Regression GLS TSCS Modeling 
This type of model is commonly found in econometric analyses (Greene, 2000).  
Because the same firm was observed for up to five consecutive years, the observations 
are not statistically independent. There are several potential sources of bias in analyses 
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of this type such as serial and contemporaneous correlation of the residuals as well as 
heteroskedasticity. The possibility of these biases suggests the need for a TSCS GLS 
approach (Maddala, 1992).  The approach best suited to the data is a modified GLS 
estimation technique discussed by Parks (1967).  The Parks model also corrects for 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation of the residuals.  Thus, a TSCS GLS 
model is used in the statistical analysis of the effect of action on performance.   
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss the sample selection procedure, 
the operationalization of constructs into measures for empirical analysis, and the 
statistical methods that are used to empirically test the hypothesized relationships. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
This chapter is divided into two major sections.  The first section presents the 
results of the hypotheses regarding the upper echelons, agency, and severance effects on 
strategic, financial, and institutional actions.  The second section presents the results of 
the hypotheses dealing with the performance consequences of those actions. 
SAMPLE SUMMARY 
This section provides empirical evidence regarding the effects of top 
management composition, incentive structure, and ownership, as well as the effects of 
parent ownership, monitoring by the parent, and the relationship between the parent and 
the spin-off prior to the spin-off event on strategic, financial, and institutional actions.  
This section consists of three subsections.  The first will address upper echelon issues, 
the second will address agency issues, and the final subsection will address severance 
effects.  These subsections will be preceded by a discussion of the sample itself and the 
distributions for the three categories of actions.    
For the period from 1986 to 1997, 182 spin-off events that fit the criteria 
specified in Chapter V were identified.  These spin-offs are across 44 industry 
classifications, with no one group holding more than nine percent of the total sample 
(see Table 2).  Additionally, the spin-offs are distributed over the period from 1986 to 
1997, with the fewest spin-offs occurring in 1986 (6) and the most in 1996 (26), with an 
average of 15 per year for the period (see Figure 2).  In terms of size, the spin-offs range 
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from no sales to $12.4 billion in sales, with an average of $612 million, indicating 
substantial breadth in the size of the firms in the sample.  For each firm, a five-year 
panel of data was assembled, with a total possible number of firm-year observations 
being 910.  Firms exit the sample through merger, acquisition, or bankruptcy; and 81 
firm year observations were dropped due to these reasons, including six firms dropped 
because no data for them are available, bringing the total possible sample size to 829 
firm years. 
A central tenet of the proposed model of spin-off action and performance 
developed in Chapter IV is that the spin-off event generates conditions that will 
necessitate actions to address new top management, agency issues, and severance 
effects.  Implicit to this view is the rationale that actions will vary over the years 
subsequent to the spin-off (see Gabarro, 1987).  Figures 3 to 6 break out by year the 
levels of all action, strategic actions, financial actions, and institutional actions, 
respectively.  These charts visually show the sometimes dramatic fluctuations in actions 
taken from year to year.  Furthermore, as Tables 3a and 3c show, mean comparisons 
between years for all actions indicate that the number of strategic actions taken in Year 1 
(the first year after spin-off) are significantly higher from those taken in Year 2 (p < .10), 
the second year after spin-off, that the strategic and financial actions taken in Year 4 are 
significantly higher than those taken in Year 3 (p < .01), and actions in all categories 
taken in Year 4 are significantly higher than those taken in Year 5 (p < .001).  Gabarro 
(1987) reported similar waves of action as he recorded managerial actions at the general 
manager level of the organization, albeit the timing of the actions is more prolonged in 
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this analysis since Gabarro’s window was 36 months and this research examines 60 
months.  Finally, the ANOVA analysis of actions by the various years (see Table 3b) 
indicates that significant variance exists over time for the summation of all the actions. 
Hence, the level of actions taken by spin-offs after their separation from their corporate 
parent varies post spin-off.  Because of this, dummy variables are entered into the 
estimated models to control for this variation in the years after spin-off.   
Means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients are reported in Table 4.  
Examining the number of observations column of the table it is apparent that several 
variables have up to 25 percent missing values.  This is a problem inherent to archival 
data sources, where the values were not reported to publicly available sources such as 
COMPUSTAT or Compact Disclosure.  All correlations in Table 4 greater than .05 are 
significant at p < .05.  The majority of high positive or negative correlations are easily 
understood.  For example, a negative correlation exists among the rationales for the spin-
off, among the CEO backgrounds, among the TMT backgrounds, and among the 
variables describing the relationship with the former corporate parent.  Since these 
categorizations are mutually exclusive, it is not surprising that they would be highly and 
negatively correlated.  A moderate correlation exists among the action variables, with 
the correlation between strategic and financial actions reaching .32; this is also intuitive 
given that these variables are not completely independent (see Chapter IV for a 
discussion of this).  In a similar vein, there is a high correlation between the CEO 
ownership percentage and the TMT ownership percentage (.67) as well as having a 
chairman of the board from the former parent and board members from the former 
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parent (.38).  Both of these findings are also quite intuitive.  Having summarized the 
sample, the focus now turns to the testing of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter IV, 
focusing first on management actions 
MANAGEMENT ACTIONS 
Following the proposed theoretical model, a total of eight hypotheses focus on 
the effect of spin-off on strategic, financial, and institutional actions.  It was argued in 
Chapter IV that the spin-off event provided motivation for action to occur, but it was 
unclear if indeed it would occur due to structural inertia, institutional forces and 
constrained vision.  Applying perspectives from the upper echelons theory, agency 
theory, and transaction cost economics, it was proposed that CEO and top management 
background, ownership, incentive contracts, monitoring, and the relationship between 
the spin-off and its former parent would affect the actions taken by the spin-off.   
Upper Echelon Issues.  The first hypothesis deals with the background of the 
CEO to head the newly independent firm.  It proposes that actions taken will be 
influenced by the experience of the CEO, with former divisional managers, corporate 
officers from the parent firm, and outsiders influencing strategic, financial, and 
institutional actions in different ways.  It is proposed that a CEO from the division will 
be focused on strategic actions, that a CEO from the former corporate parent will be 
focused on financial and strategic actions, and that a CEO from outside the firm will 
focus on institutional, financial, and strategic actions. The second hypothesis proposed a 
similar rationale for the dominance of the top management team (conceptualized as the 
CEO, Chairman of the Board, President, CFO, and COO).   
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Because of the interdependent nature of these two hypotheses, they are tested 
jointly.  To test this hypothesis, dummy variables were entered into models 2, 4, and 6 of 
Table 5a for divisional CEO and corporate CEO, with outside CEO as the omitted 
category.  A post estimation test of the equality of the divisional CEO and corporate 
CEO coefficients, found in Table 5b, provides the necessary contrast between those two 
categories.  For the TMT, all three dummy variables were entered and compared to the 
base category of no TMT domination.  Post estimation tests of the equality of the 
coefficients were also conducted on the TMT domination categories.  The first 
hypothesis states: 
H1. The selection of the spin-off CEO will affect managerial action, with  
(a) The selection of an insider divisional manager as CEO increasing the 
likelihood of strategic management actions;  
(b) The selection of an insider corporate manager CEO increasing the likelihood 
of financial and strategic management actions; and  
(c) The selection of an outsider as CEO increasing the likelihood of institutional, 
financial, and strategic management actions. 
Results for this hypothesis are found in models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 5a, along with the 
post estimation test results found in Table 5b.  No support is found for H1a, with the 
coefficient being opposite to the posited sign, but not significant.8  This is determined by 
evaluating the coefficient for divisional CEO in model 2 (β = -.089), with a negative sign 
suggesting that divisional CEOs reduce the likelihood of strategic actions when 
compared with outside CEOs.  The coefficient is also less than the coefficient for 
                                                 
8 It is important to note that if the coefficient is not significant, then no statistically the result is not 
different from zero and thus no statistical inference can be made; however, for this research the signs of 
the coefficients are given to provide the reader a sense of direction regarding the results of the empirical 
models. 
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corporate CEOs (i.e., -.089 < -.16), suggesting that a divisional CEO is less likely to take 
action than a corporate CEO.  For H1b, the coefficient for the financial actions model 
(model 4) is of the right sign (β = .102), but is not significant.  The coefficient for the 
strategic actions model is also not significant and is of the opposite sign (β = -.16), 
indicating that a corporate CEO is less likely to take action than an outside CEO, as well 
as a divisional CEO as was stated previously.  Thus, no support is found for H1b.  
Finally, the coefficients for divisional CEO and corporate CEO in the strategic action 
(model 2) and institutional action (model 6) are of the right sign (β = -.03 and β = -.147), 
indicating that outsider CEOs take more action than divisional or corporate CEOs, but 
none of the coefficients are significant.  The coefficients for divisional CEO and 
corporate CEO in the financial action model (model 4) are also not significant and are of 
the opposite sign.  Hence, H1c is also not supported.  The second hypothesis states, 
H2. The composition of spin-off top management will affect managerial action, with  
(a) Insider divisional dominated top management increasing the likelihood of 
strategic management actions;  
(b) Insider corporate dominated top management increasing the likelihood of 
financial and strategic management actions; and  
(c) Outsider dominated top management increasing the likelihood of 
institutional, financial, and strategic management actions. 
Results for this hypothesis are also found in models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 5a, along with 
the post estimation test results found in Table 5b.  No support is found for H2a, with the 
coefficient being opposite to the posited sign when compared with corporate CEOs but 
of the right sign when compared with outside CEOs, but with none of the coefficients 
statistically significant.  This is determined by evaluating the coefficient for divisional 
TMT in model 2 (β = -.156), with a negative sign indicating that divisionally dominated 
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TMTs reduce the likelihood of strategic actions when compared with non-dominated 
TMTs.  The coefficient is less than the coefficient for corporate TMTs (i.e., -.156 < -
.074), suggesting that a divisionally dominated TMT is less likely to take action than a 
corporate dominated TMT.  However, the coefficient for divisionally dominated TMTs 
is greater than the coefficient for outsider dominated TMTs (-.156 > -.315), indicating 
that a divisionally dominated TMT is more likely to take action than a corporate 
dominated TMT.  Nevertheless, none of the coefficients were statistically significant and 
so H2a is not supported. 
For H1b, the coefficient for the financial actions model (model 4) is of the right 
sign when compared with non-dominated TMTs and with outsider dominated TMTs (β = 
-.138 > -.289), but is not of the right sign with divisionally dominated TMTs (-.138 < -
.089), and is not significant for any of the coefficients.  The coefficient for the strategic 
actions model is also not significant, but is of the right sign compared with divisionally 
and outsider dominated TMTs (-.074 > -.156 and -.074 < -.315, respectively).  However, 
the negative sign of the coefficient (β = -.138) in model 2 indicates that although 
corporate dominated TMTs are more likely to take strategic actions than either 
divisionally or outsider dominated TMTs, they are less likely to take action than non-
dominated TMTs. Thus, no support is found for H2b.   
Finally, the coefficients for outsider TMTs in model 2 is statistically significant 
(β = -.315, p < .10), indicating that outsider dominated TMTs are less likely to take 
actions than non outsider dominated TMTs, refuting the strategic action portion of H2c.  
In addition, as was discussed previously, the coefficient for outsider dominated TMTs is 
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more negative than either divisionally or corporate dominated TMTs (although none 
were statistically significant), suggesting that outsider dominated TMTs are the least 
likely to take strategic actions.  The same holds true for financial actions (model 4), with 
the coefficient for outsider dominated TMTs less than either non-dominated, divisionally 
dominated, or corporate dominated TMTs (β = -.289 < -.138 < -.089).  With regard to 
institutional actions, the negative coefficient (β = -.14) suggests that outsider dominated 
TMTs are less likely than non-dominated TMTs to take institutional actions, although 
the coefficient is not significant.  In addition, the coefficient is greater than corporate 
dominated TMTs (-.14 > -.18) and is almost equal to divisional dominated TMTs (-
.139), but again, none of the coefficients are significant.  Hence, H2c is also not 
supported.   
In summary, neither of the proposed upper echelons hypotheses were supported 
by the empirical evidence.  Chapter VII will examine potential reasons for this and 
Chapter VIII will explore the implications of these findings on future studies. 
Agency Issues.  The next set of hypotheses deals with the effects of incentives, 
ownership, and monitoring on the actions taken by the spin-off subsequent to its exit 
from the corporate parent’s organization.  First, the extant agency literature suggests that 
incentive-based contracts align the interests of owners and managers.  If managers can 
share in the reward rather than simply bearing the risk of taking actions, it is proposed 
that actions are more likely to occur.  In the proposed model, it was argued that 
incentive-based contracts will motivate CEOs to take certain categories of actions, as is 
stated in the third hypothesis, 
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H3. Incentive-based management employment contracts will increase the likelihood 
of strategic and financial management actions. 
This hypothesis is tested by entering the dummy variable indicating the existence of 
stock options for the CEO into models with strategic actions and financial actions as the 
dependent variables (shown in Models 2 and 4 of Table 5a).  While the coefficient is of 
the right sign for both strategic actions (β = .104) and financial actions (β = .257), neither 
is statistically significant.  Thus, H3 receives no support.  
Next, the extant agency literature also suggests that higher levels of managerial 
ownership lead to better alignment of managerial and owner interests.  As Hambrick and 
Stucker (1999) suggest, whereas a divisional executive or corporate manager may only 
own a very small percent of the parent firm’s stock, those executives as spin-off top 
managers often have the opportunity to possess a much larger stake in the spun-off firm.  
In the proposed theoretical model, it is theorized that higher ownership stakes for both 
the CEO and the top management would motivate them to take specific actions, as is 
stated in the fourth hypothesis, 
H4. Higher levels of management ownership will increase the likelihood of strategic 
and financial management actions. 
This hypothesis is tested by entering the percent of stock owned for both the CEO and 
the TMT (not including the CEO) into the models with strategic actions and financial 
actions as the dependent variables (shown in models 2 and 4 of Table 5a).  Results 
indicate that the percent of stock owned by CEOs has a statistically significant, but 
negative effect on financial action (β = -5.693, p < .05), but no significant effect on 
strategic action (with the sign in the opposite direction (β = -.935)).  Curiously, the effect 
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of CEO stock ownership on institutional actions is positive and statistically significant (β 
= 3.21, p < .05).  For TMT ownership, a positive and statistically significant effect was 
found for both strategic actions (β = 3.00, p < .10) and financial actions (β = 4.497, p < 
.10), as was hypothesized.  Thus, mixed support is found for H4. 
The fifth, sixth, and seventh hypotheses deal with the issue of ownership by the 
former corporate parent and monitoring through the board of directors by that parent.  
Although a criterion for inclusion in the study was that the parent must spin-off at least 
80 percent or more of the former division, it is possible for the parent to retain up to a 20 
percent stake in the spin-off, and the theoretical model proposes that this tie to the 
former corporate parent will dampen actions across the board, as is stated in the fifth 
hypothesis, 
H5. Higher levels of corporate parent ownership will decrease the likelihood of 
strategic, financial, and institutional management actions. 
Information regarding the parent’s ownership in its former division was culled from the 
10K filings with the SEC.  Owners holding five percent or more must disclose their 
ownership stake, and a dummy variable was set to indicate if the corporate parent held 
five percent or more in their former division.  This dummy variable was entered into 
Models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 5a.  Although none of the coefficients were statistically 
significant, the coefficients for the financial action and institutional action models 
(models 4 and 6) were of the posited sign (β = -.268 and β = -.024, respectively), but the 
coefficient for the strategic action model (model 2) was positive (β = .223).  Thus, H5 
finds no empirical support. 
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 Next, H6 and H7 deal with monitoring of the spin-off, through the board of 
directors, by corporate officers from the former corporate parent.  Monitoring by 
corporate officers from the parent firm is proposed to have a dampening effect on all 
actions for the spin-off firm given that the parent firm still maintains oversight of its 
former division.  This is summarized in the sixth and seventh hypotheses,  
H6. Spin-off boards with a chairman from the parent firm will decrease the likelihood 
of strategic, financial, and institutional management actions. 
H7. Higher representation of board members from the parent firm on the spin-off’s 
board will decrease the likelihood of strategic, financial, and institutional 
management actions. 
H6 is tested by entering a dummy variable into Models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 5a, 
indicating that the chairman of the board is an officer of the parent firm.  Likewise, H7 is 
tested in the same models by entering a dummy indicating board members of the spin-
off are corporate officers of the parent firm.  For H6, having a chairman of the board 
from the corporate parent decreased the likelihood of financial actions (β = -.454, p < 
.05), but had no significant effect on strategic or institutional actions, although the 
coefficient is of the posited sign for the strategic action model (β = -.262), providing 
limited support for this hypothesis.  For H7, board members from the corporate parent 
had no significant effect on any category of action, although the coefficient for the 
institutional action model is of the proposed sign (β = -.054); thus, H7 is refuted.   
Severance Effects.  The final hypothesis of this subsection deals with the 
severance effects arising from separation from the corporate parent’s organizational 
structure.  Applying a transaction cost logic, it was argued that actions post spin-off 
would be affected by the relationship between the parent and the division prior to spin-
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off.  Following Jones and Hill (1988) three relationships were proposed, namely related 
(i.e., tightly coupled to the parent organization), vertically integrated (i.e., a buyer or 
supplier of the parent organization), or unrelated (i.e., the division has little linkage to 
the parent organization’s business).  Using these categorizations, the eighth hypothesis 
states,  
H8. The diversification relationship between the spin-off and its former parent will 
affect top management actions, with 
(a) Unrelatedly diversified relationships increasing the likelihood of financial 
management actions;  
(b) Vertically integrated relationships increasing the likelihood of financial and 
strategic management actions; and,  
(c) Relatedly diversified relationships increasing the likelihood of financial, 
strategic, and institutional management actions. 
This hypothesis was tested by entering dummy variables for related and vertically 
integrated former relationships into the models for strategic, financial, or institutional 
action (models 2, 4 & 6 of Table 5a).  Firms that were unrelated to their corporate parent 
were in the omitted category.  For H8a, the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient in model 4 for firms that were related to their corporate parent (β = -.475, p < 
.05) indicates that firms unrelated to their corporate parent take more financial actions 
than firms that were related.  The coefficient for vertically integrated in model 4 is 
negative (β = -.101), suggesting that unrelated firms take more financial actions than 
vertically integrated firms, but the coefficient is not significant.  Thus, some support was 
found for H8a.   
For H8b, comparing the coefficients of vertically integrated and related firms in 
model 4 suggests that firms that where vertically integrated take more financial actions 
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than firms that were related, but the χ2 tests on Table 5b finds no statistically significant 
difference.  As was discussed previously, the negative coefficient for firms that were 
vertically integrated (β = -.101 found in model 4) suggests that they take fewer financial 
actions than firms which were unrelated, although the coefficient is not significant.  
Turning to strategic actions, again the negative coefficient for firms that were vertically 
integrated (β = -.075 found in model 2) suggests that they take fewer strategic actions 
than firms which were unrelated, although again the coefficient is not significant.  
However, the coefficient for firms that were vertically integrated is less that that of firms 
which were related (-.075 < .096), but the χ2 test on Table 5b finds no statistically 
significant difference.  Thus, H8b receives no support. 
 Finally, the prior discussion has described how firms that were related to their 
parent are more likely to take strategic actions than vertically integrated firms (although 
the results were not significant) and that related firms are less likely to take financial 
actions than either firms that were unrelated (p < .05) or vertically integrated (not 
significant).  The positive coefficient for firms that were related in model 2 (β = .096) 
suggests that related firms are more likely to take strategic actions than unrelated firms 
(although the coefficient is not significant).  Additionally, the coefficient for firms that 
were related in model 6 (β = .266) suggests that related firms take more strategic actions 
than firms that were either unrelated or vertically integrated (.266 > .176), although this 
was not statistically significant in either case.  Consequently, H8c receives no support. 
  
 
100
Summary 
The empirical results presented above are summarized in Table 8.  Results may 
be summarized as follows.  First, the CEO and TMT dominance had no statistically 
significant effect on strategic, financial, or institutional action, although many of the 
signs were in the proposed direction.  Next, incentive-based contracts in the form of 
stock options were shown to have no significant effect on strategic actions or financial 
actions although the signs were in the posited direction.  Third, the percentage of stock 
owned by the CEO decreased the likelihood of financial actions and increased the 
likelihood of institutional actions while the percentage owned by the TMT was found to 
increase the likelihood of both strategic and financial actions. 
 Third, it is also surprising that ties to the former corporate parent through five 
percent or greater ownership had no significant effect on strategic, financial, or 
institutional actions, although the signs for the effect on financial and institutional 
actions were in the proposed direction.  Fifth, monitoring by a chairman of the board 
who is an officer of the former corporate parent was found to significantly decrease the 
likelihood of financial actions, but had no significant effect on strategic or institutional 
actions although the sign for strategic actions was in the proposed direction.  Sixth, 
monitoring from corporate officers of the former parent had a limited effect on action, 
with chairman of the board from the corporate parent decreasing financial actions (with 
the effect for strategic actions in the proposed direction but not significant) and board 
members from the corporate parent having no significant effect on actions, although the 
effect for institutional actions was in the right direction).  Finally, severance effects from 
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leaving the corporate parent’s organizational structure had a limited effect on actions, 
with spin-offs that were unrelated to their former parent having a higher likelihood of 
financial actions than those that were related.  No other statistically significant 
relationships emerged, although several of the signs were in the proposed direction. 
Discussion of the above results regarding the effects of spin-off on strategic, 
financial, and institutional action and their implication for the proposed theoretical 
model is presented in Chapter VII. 
PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES 
Following the proposed theoretical model, two hypotheses focus on the effect of 
spin-off strategic, financial, and institutional actions on a variety of performance metrics. 
It was argued in Chapter IV that although there is no “rule for riches” (Barney, 2001) 
that dictated a priori what actions would lead to superior performance, actions taken 
post spin-off do have performance consequences and as such warrant empirical 
examination.  Accordingly, hypotheses were proposed that examine the effect of inaction 
on operating, market, and hybrid measures of performance as well as the effect of the 
various categories of action on performance according to the relationship of the spin-off 
to its former corporate parent.   
Effect Of Actions On Performance For All Spin-Offs 
The ninth hypothesis deals with the effects of inaction on performance.  Rather 
than proposing that a particular type of action will be positively related to spin-off 
performance, the proposed theory suggests that the spin-off event contains an implicit 
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impetus for action embedded in its separation from its former parent.  Accordingly, 
hypothesis nine states,  
H9. For spin-off firms, top management inaction will lead to lower performance.   
The hypothesis was tested by entering a dummy variable for inaction, which was set to 
one if there were no actions during the period and zero if there were actions, into the 
model with accounting (ROA, ROS, ROE), market performance, and Tobin’s q 
measures of performance (as dependent variables) for the subsequent year.  The one-year 
lag is necessary given that the effect of the actions taken will not be apparent in the year 
they are taken, but rather in subsequent years.  Empirical results indicate that Tobin’s q 
is negatively related to inaction (β = -.123, p < .05 in model 8 of Table 6), with no other 
significant coefficients; however, the sign of the other coefficients is in the right 
direction (βROA = -.003 βROS = -.057, βROE = -.028, βMarket Perf = -.026).  This provides 
some support to the hypothesized relationship of H9. 
Effect of Actions on Performance by Relationship Category   
The final hypothesis provides a more fine-grained analysis of the effect of action 
on spin-off performance by examining how strategic, financial, and institutional actions 
affect the performance of firms that were related to the former corporate parent’s 
business, were vertically integrated into the parent’s business, or were unrelated to their 
former parent’s business.  Applying the logic that severance from the organizational 
structure will leave financial, operational, or institutional gaps in the spin-off’s structure, 
it is proposed that spin-off firms that seek to address those gaps will exhibit superior 
performance.  This is summarized in the tenth hypothesis, which states, 
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H10. Spin-off performance will be affected by managerial actions according to the 
corporate relationship with the former parent, with  
(a) Financial actions by top management positively affecting spin-off 
performance when the spin-off was unrelated to its former parent;  
(b) Financial and strategic actions by top management positively affecting spin-
off performance when the spin-off was vertically linked with its former parent; 
and  
(c) Financial, strategic, and institutional actions by top management positively 
affecting spin-off performance when the spin-off was related to its former parent. 
This hypothesis is tested by introducing the three categories of action (strategic, 
financial, and institutional) into the performance models and then introducing 
interactions between the various categories of action and the relationship between the 
spin-off firm and its former corporate parent.  The performance models for ROS and 
ROE are not reported because none of the interactions were statistically significant, nor 
were the models.   
 First, it is interesting to note the effect of adding the categories of action to the 
performance models.  Although no a priori predictions were made concerning the 
influence of actions on performance, model 1 in Table 7a indicates that strategic actions 
have a negative effect on ROA (β = -.013, p < .01), but financial and institutional actions 
have positive effects (β = .013 and β = .012, respectively, both p < .05).  For model 1 in 
Table 7c, market performance was positively influenced by institutional actions (β = 
.038, p < .05).  In terms of the relationship of the spin-off to its former parent, the 
performance model for Tobin’s q indicates that firms that were related have higher 
Tobin’s q than firms that were unrelated (β = .18, p < .01 in model 1 of Table 7b), and 
firms that were vertically integrated have lower Tobin’s q than firms that were unrelated 
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(β = -.164, p < .10 in model 1 of Table 7b), and that firms that were related have a 
significantly higher Tobin’s q than firms that were vertically integrated (χ2 = 12.68, p < 
.001).   
 Turning to the hypothesized relationships, H10a finds no statistically significant 
support, although the coefficient for the interaction for market performance was positive 
(β = .023 in model 8 of Table 7c).  This suggests no support for H10a.  For H10b, the 
interaction of vertical integration and financial actions is positive and significant for the 
ROA performance model (β = .061, p < .01 in model 6 of Table 7b), but there were no 
other significant relationships although the coefficients for the interactions for strategic 
and financial actions and vertical integration for the Tobin’s q performance model are of 
the right sign (β = .095 and β = .091 of models 5 and 6 of Table 7b, respectively) and the 
interaction for financial actions and vertical integration for the market performance 
model is of the right sign (β = .031).  Thus, limited support is found for H10b.  Finally, 
no support is found for H10c, with the only significant coefficients of the opposite sign.  
The interaction of firms that were related and institutional actions yielded a negative and 
significant coefficient for the market performance model (β = -.147, p < .001 in model 3 
of Table 7c) as well as for the Tobin’s q performance model (β = -.118, p < .05 model 3 
of Table 7b).  The interaction for financial actions and related firm for the ROA 
performance model are of the right sign (β = .005, model 2 of Table 7a) but not 
significant, as are the interactions for strategic and financial actions and related firm for 
the Tobin’s q performance model (β = .081 and β = .071 of model 3 and model 2 of 
Table 7b, respectively) and strategic actions and related firm for the market performance 
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model are of the right sign (β = .029 of model 4 of Table 7c).  Thus, H10c is refuted by 
the empirical evidence.   
Control Variables 
Several control variables were proposed in Chapter V as necessary to ensure the 
validity of the empirical results.  The control variables fall into several classes.  First, the 
current ratio and the debt to asset ratios were introduced to control for the ability of the 
firm to take action post spin-off.  In other words, although a spin-off could perceive an 
opportunity and desire to take action, it may be restrained due to a lack of liquidity or an 
inordinate amount of debt.  The current ratio controls for liquidity issues and the debt to 
assets ratio controls for inordinate debt.  For the action-based models, the current ratio 
was mostly negative and not significant, while the debt to assets ratio was never 
significant.  For the performance models the current ratio was negative and significant 
for ROS and market performance, while the debt to assets ratio was negative for ROA. 
Next, the size of the spin-off relative to the parent firm was suggested to be an 
important control for action as well as performance.  For the action-based models it was 
found to increase the likelihood of financial actions, but decrease the likelihood of 
institutional actions.  Finally, for the performance-based models size relative to parent 
was found to be negatively related to Tobin’s q. 
The third control variable is the rationale stated for the spin-off, with three major 
categories: focus increasing, problem solving, or financial issues.  In the action-based 
models, all categories increase the likelihood of the financial actions compared to the 
base category of all other rationales, while financial issues decreases the likelihood of 
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institutional actions compared to all other actions.  In the performance-based models, all 
categories were found to have a positive relationship with ROA and ROS, but a negative 
relationship with Tobin’s q.   
The fourth set of control variables are “time since the spin-off event” dummies 
that control for the variation in the level of action across the years since spin-off.  In the 
action-based models, the dummy for the fifth year post spin-off was negative and 
significant when compared to the first year and the dummy for the fourth year was found 
to be positive and significant when compared to the first year for the financial actions.  
For the performance models, the fourth year post spin-off was found to be negative and 
significant for ROA, but no other time dummies were significant. 
The fifth set of variables control for changes in the CEO or the domination of the 
TMT.  The CEO succession dummy is not significant in any of the action-based models, 
although TMT domination change is positive and significant for the baseline strategic 
action model (model 1 of Table 5a).  For the performance models, the CEO succession 
dummy is not significant for any of the models while the change in TMT domination is 
negative and significant for the Tobin’s q performance model.   
In addition to these control variables, two-digit industry dummy variables and 
year dummy variables were entered into all of the model to control for economic and 
industry effects.  For the sake of parsimony, these coefficients are not listed in the tables 
presented in this research, but the reported results include them as a control variable.   
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Summary 
The empirical results presented above are summarized in Table 8.  Results may 
be summed as follows.  First, the empirical evidence suggests that inaction is negatively 
associated with performance as was hypothesized in Chapter IV.  Second, the specific 
analysis of the effect of strategic, financial, and institutional actions according to the 
relationship of the spun-off firm to its former corporate parent was mixed, with a 
positive and significant interaction for financial actions and firms that were vertically 
integrated for ROA, but a negative and significant interaction for institutional actions 
and firms that were related for market performance and Tobin’s q.  Thus, the empirical 
evidence shows little relationship between the specific actions taken and the relationship 
of the spin-off firm with its former parent on the various performance measures. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the empirical evidence regarding the effect of top 
management designation, incentives, managerial and parent ownership, monitoring by 
officers from the corporate parent, and severance effects on the strategic, financial, and 
institutional actions taken by a spin-off after its separation from its corporate parent.  
Additionally, the chapter presents empirical evidence regarding the effect of strategic, 
financial, and institutional actions on subsequent operating, market, and hybrid measures 
of performance.  The findings from the studies are consistent and stable, and provide 
insight into what actions occur subsequent to spin-off as well as the performance 
implications of those actions.  The next chapter will address the contribution of these 
findings to the extant literature. 
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the results from the preceding chapter, and is divided into 
two major sections.  The first section discusses the results regarding management 
actions, and the second discusses the performance consequences of those actions.   
MANAGEMENT ACTIONS 
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter VI presents some interesting results 
about the effect of various spin-off conditions on strategic, financial, and institutional 
actions.  The model proposed in Chapter IV identified several conditions present in all 
spin-offs, namely the background of the CEO and TMT, the establishment of incentive 
contracts, the extent of management ownership, links to the prior corporate parent 
through ownership or monitoring relationships, and severance effects incurred upon 
leaving the corporate parent’s organizational structure.  Although the discussion in 
Chapter IV acknowledged that it was possible that actions might not be taken (due to 
structural inertia, institutional constraints, or managerial myopia), it was theorized that 
the conditions at spin-off would encourage actions to occur.  The empirical results lend 
very limited support for the hypothesized relationships regarding when actions would 
occur.  The purpose of this subsection is to examine more carefully the conditions under 
which actions were found to occur and to explore why the theorized relationships were 
not found. 
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CEO and Top Management 
It was argued in the theoretical model that the position of the CEO and the top 
managers of the spin-off would affect the actions taken.  This argument is based in the 
human capital (Becker, 1964), both specific and general, that they bring to the 
opportunity of managing the spin-off.  In other words, the CEO or TMT would be 
focused on particular actions because their prior position either focused on those actions 
or at least gave them exposure to that set of actions.  Following this logic, it was 
proposed that divisional managers that become CEOs or TMT members of the spin-off 
would be most focused on strategic actions (operations based), while corporate officers 
of the parent firm that become CEOs or TMT members of the spin-off would be most 
focused on financial actions, as well as strategic actions, and that CEOs or TMT 
members of the spin-off that were selected from outside the firm would be most focused 
on institutional actions and financial actions, but would have no reluctance in taking 
strategic actions (e.g., laying off employees or shutting down plants).   
In evaluating the effect of the top managers on action, it is critical to control for 
the TMT type when evaluating the effect of the CEO and to control for the effect of the 
CEO when evaluating the effect of the TMT.  Consequently, models were estimated that 
included both CEO and TMT types.  For these analyses, outsider CEO was the base 
category for CEO background while non-dominated TMTs were the base category for 
the TMT domination.  On the whole, although the signs of many of the coefficients were 
in the correct direction, no support was found for these hypotheses.  This finding is 
interesting when compared with the findings of Wruck and Wruck (2002), who found 
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that the selection of the CEO and TMT influenced the market reaction to the spin-off 
event (for both the parent and the spin-off).  This research suggests that the prior 
position of the CEO and the domination of the TMT by a particular prior background 
does not have bearing on what strategic, financial, or institutional actions occur post 
spin-off.   Thus, while the background of the CEO and TMT may be an important 
market signal at the debut of the spin-off firm, it does not have any significant 
relationship to what occurs subsequent to that debut.  This research did not, however, 
assess the effect of the background of the CEO and TMT directly on performance, nor 
did it assess the appropriateness of the background of a CEO or TMT to a given situation 
(e.g., separation due to financial distress, to increase focus, etc.).  It is possible that the 
background of the CEO and TMT moderate the relationship between the actions and 
performance of the spin-off firm.  Nonetheless, no support was found for the 
hypothesized relationships that CEO and TMT backgrounds affect the actions taken by 
the spin-off firm. 
Incentives, Ownership and Monitoring 
It was argued in the theoretical model that incentive-based contracts, managerial 
ownership, parent ownership, and monitoring by the parent firm would affect the actions 
taken.  These arguments are based largely upon an agency theory perspective that the 
better the alignment of ownership and control, the better the performance of the firm.  In 
terms of incentive-based contracts, the presence of stock options had no significant 
effect on strategic, financial, or institutional actions, although all the signs were in the 
right direction.  The pervasiveness of stock options, along with the dichotomous nature 
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of the operationalization of the variable, may have contributed to the lack of findings.  
From Table 4 it can be seen that more than three-quarters of the CEOs were granted 
options, so the predictive power of this variable may be somewhat diluted by its lack of 
variance. 
Next, in terms of managerial ownership, an interesting bifurcation occurs 
between CEOs and TMTs.   Following Hambrick and Stucker (1999), it was suggested 
that the significantly higher levels of managerial ownership in the spin-off firm would be 
an incentive for action by top managers.  This rationale is similar to the agency theory 
perspective that suggests increasing managerial ownership assuages, to some extent, 
agency issues in the firm (McConnell & Servaes, 1990).  The results indicate that the 
higher the percentage owned by CEOs, the less likely they are to undertake financial 
actions and the sign for strategic actions is negative as well, but not significant, while 
higher percentages owned by CEOs increases the likelihood of institutional actions.  In 
contrast to this, higher percentages of ownership by TMTs were shown to increase the 
likelihood of financial and strategic actions, but the coefficient for institutional actions 
was negative, and not significant.  These findings may show an underlying risk 
preference difference on the part of the CEO and the TMT.  As the most visible 
individual in the organization, the CEO may be more risk adverse in the spin-off setting, 
realizing that managing a spin-off can be a precarious endeavor.  Thus, the CEO may 
prefer the more symbolic institutional actions as external signals rather than strategic 
(operational) or financial actions that may carry a higher penalty if they fail.  
Conversely, the less visible TMT members may desire to undertake more radical change 
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to improve their fortunes, eschewing the symbolic institutional actions in favor of more 
substantive change in terms of strategic or financial actions.  Clearly this finding 
warrants further investigation. 
 Third, in addition to managerial ownership, ownership by the parent organization 
was assessed to determine if it had a dampening effect on managerial action.  No 
statistically significant effect was found such that five percent or greater ownership 
decreased (or increased) the likelihood of strategic, financial, or institutional actions, 
although the signs for financial and institutional actions were in the proposed direction.  
It may be that the five percent or greater ownership post spin-off is an artifact of the 
spin-off deal, given that only seven percent of firms keep five percent or more of their 
former division (see Table 4), and by the fourth and fifth year post spin-off, that percent 
is cut in half.  Hence, it does not appear that parent firms seek to control their former 
divisions through an ownership relationship. 
 The focus next turns to the situation when the former parent maintains a 
monitoring relationship with the spin-off through the chairmanship of the board or 
membership on the board of directors.  As hypothesized, having a chairman from the 
parent decreased the likelihood of financial actions and had no significant effect on 
strategic or institutional actions (although the coefficient for strategic actions was in the 
hypothesized direction).  Board members from the parent firm, however, did not 
significantly decrease (or increase) the likelihood of action (although the coefficient for 
institutional actions was in the hypothesized direction).  Thus, having a chairman from 
the parent has a restrictive effect on financial actions only, and other monitoring did not 
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significantly influence the actions taken.  Similar to five percent ownership by the 
parent, monitoring by the chairman of the board is greater than 20 percent in the first two 
years post spin-off, but drops off to around 15 percent after that, with a comparable 
result found for monitoring by board members from the parent.  It is possible that the 
connection to the spun-off firm, after the spin-off event, is largely symbolic or an artifact 
of the long relationship between the two organizations rather than one that would 
substantively influence strategic, financial, or institutional actions. 
Severance Effects 
Finally, a transaction cost logic was applied to predict how the relationship with 
the parent firm prior to spin-off would affect action post spin-off.  Results show that, as 
hypothesized, spin-offs unrelated to their corporate parents’ operations had an increased 
likelihood of financial actions when compared to firms that were related, but no other 
significant effects were found.  The theory used to form these predictions suggested that 
the tighter the linkages to the corporate parent, the greater the need for strategic action 
post spin-off.  In the case of unrelated firms (the most loosely linked), it is clear that they 
must take financial actions to address the loss of internal capital markets of the parent, 
but this was not the case for either related or vertically integrated firms (although the 
coefficient for vertically integrated firms was in the right direction when compared to 
firms that were related to their parent).  Quite the opposite, firms related to their 
corporate parents were found to be less likely to engage in financial actions than firms 
that were unrelated and vertically integrated (coefficient of the right sign but not 
significant), although they suffer the same losses of internal capital markets that the 
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other two relationship types experience.  It is also interesting to note that no significant 
results were found for strategic actions for related firms, although the sign of the 
coefficient was in the right direction when compared to both vertically integrated and 
unrelated firms.  Moreover, the coefficient for institutional actions for related firms was 
in the right direction, but not significant when compared with firms that were unrelated, 
but was of the wrong sign and also not significant when compared with firms that were 
vertically integrated.   These results suggest that the relation of the spin-off to its 
corporate parent has relatively little effect on the likelihood of actions occurring, 
possibly indicating that the disintegration effects of spin-off may not be as substantial as 
was suggested by Woo and colleagues (1992).  One possible explanation for the lack of 
severance effect results is parent firms may assuage these effects prior to the exit of the 
division from the parent firm’s structure (and before the study window of this research).  
While this is probable, it is unlikely that this is the case with all spin-offs.  In a similar 
vein, it is possible that the division is sequestered prior to the spin-off such that the spin-
off effects again occur outside the study window (although the parent firm may not take 
any explicit actions to assuage these effects).  Thus, this area remains open to further 
exploration.   
Conclusions  
Several conclusions may be drawn from the empirical results described in this 
section.  First, the actions taken by the top management team were not found to vary 
according to the CEO/TMT composition.  This contrasts with Wruck and Wruck’s 
(2002) assertion that suggests diverse human capital is a necessary and valuable resource 
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to the spin-off firm.  Second, examination of agency issues resulted in a mixed bag, with 
options having no significant relationship to actions, but CEO and TMT ownership 
having divergent effects on strategic, financial, and institutional actions.  Moreover, 
monitoring by a chairman of the board from the parent firm decreased the likelihood of 
financial actions, but board members from the parent firm and five percent or greater 
ownership had no effect on the likelihood of the three categories of actions.  This 
combination of findings suggests that traditional agency issues may differ for newly 
spun-off firms.  Finally, the empirical evidence suggests that the relationship with the 
former corporate parent prior to spin-off is not as central an issue to what occurs post 
spin-off as would be suspected (Woo et al., 1992).  In other words, addressing issues 
arising from corporate disintegration appears to not be as significant an issue as was 
proposed in the theoretical model.  
PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES 
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter VI also presents some interesting 
results about the effect of spin-off strategic, financial, and institutional actions on 
performance.  The intention in applying a broad array of performance metrics to assess 
the implications of actions on spin-off is to provide a more holistic picture of how 
actions, or inaction, affects spin-off performance.  Operating measures were used to 
assess performance such as a firm’s ability to generate income from its asset base 
(ROA), the firm’s ability to increase its earnings per share (ROE), and a measure of the 
firm’s gross profit margin (ROS).  The market measure examines how much $1 invested 
in the firm at the beginning of the year is worth at the end of the year and as such 
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provides a measure of the market’s perception of the future earnings of the spin-off.  
Finally, pseudo Tobin’s q (i.e., market to book ratio) is calculated as a hybrid measure 
that examines the combined stock market valuation divided by the combined 
replacement costs of the spin-off’s assets.  This measure helps to give a sense of the 
value of intangibles, such as human capital or brand, which may not be correctly valued 
from an accounting perspective.  Thus, using a multi-measure approach, this research 
seeks to better understand the influence of action on performance. 
The discussion will be divided into two parts.  The first will deal with the 
relationship between inaction and performance outcomes and the second will deal with 
the relationship between actions and performance outcomes according to the relationship 
the spin-off had with its corporate parent. 
Effects of Inaction on Performance 
The overarching theoretical rationale applied to this set of hypotheses is that the 
spin-off event is an implied, if not overt, opportunity to take action.  The untethering of 
the division from the parent corporation so that it may pursue its own course is an 
example of this, as is the general stock market reaction to the spin-off announcement and 
the subsequent spin-off event (Miles & Woolridge, 1999), both of which were argued to 
send a signal to the top management of the spin-off that the firm is expected to act upon 
the opportunity presented.  However, it is not known a priori what actions would result 
in positive performance, but that there would be a bias towards action in response to the 
opportunity presented by the spin-off.  The empirical results for this prediction are that 
inaction is negatively associated with Tobin’s q, with none of the other coefficients 
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significant.  It is noteworthy that all the non-significant coefficients are in the right 
direction (negative).  This provides some support for the contention that inaction 
negatively affects spin-off performance and that failing to respond to the opportunity 
presented by the spin-off will result in lower performance.  Moreover, it is interesting 
that significance for this hypothesized relationship was found with the hybrid 
performance measure, Tobin’s q.  Researchers often favor Tobin’s q over pure 
accounting and market measures because both are taken into account in its formulation, 
which may underlie its significance. 
Effects of Action on Performance by Relationship with Parent 
In addition to examining the effects of inaction on spin-off performance, the 
theoretical model proposed that spin-offs would take certain actions to address 
disintegration of their links with their corporate parent, and that these actions would lead 
to positive performance results.  Building upon the logic of Jones and Hill (1988), it was 
proposed in Chapter IV that all spin-offs would experience losses of internal capital 
markets, suggesting that financial actions would increase performance.  For spin-offs 
that were vertically integrated with their former corporate parents, it was proposed that 
they would need to address structural issues as well as financial issues, suggesting that 
these actions would increase performance.  Finally, it was proposed that firms related to 
their corporate parents would need to take institutional actions in addition to financial 
and strategic actions, and that action taken in those categories would increase 
performance.   
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The empirical evidence was somewhat mixed for the predicted relationships.  
The interaction of vertically integrated with financial actions was positive and significant 
for ROA, as predicted.  However, the interaction of related with institutional actions was 
negative and significant for market performance and Tobin’s q, contrary to prediction.  
These findings suggest that, in contrast to the conjecture of Woo and colleagues (1992), 
the relationship between the corporate parent and the spin-off has less to do with spin-off 
performance than would be thought.  It is possible that in the time leading up to the spin-
off, the division is sequestered such that it resolves the issues surrounding its impending 
separation from the parent firm and as such is able to emerge as an independent firm 
without the separation issues that were proposed building on the work of Jones and Hill 
(1988).  It is particularly interesting that the interaction of institutional actions with firms 
that were related yielded a negative coefficient.  Unlike financial or operational issues, 
which could be resolved prior to spin-off, institutional issues are almost entirely post 
spin-off in nature.  In other words, the firm cannot establish itself as an independent 
entity until it is an independent entity.  It is possible that these institutional actions take 
time to yield positive performance results, with the short-term effect being a drop in 
performance.   
Although no hypotheses were proffered a priori regarding the effect of action on 
performance, the empirical evidence is noteworthy.  This evidence shows that strategic 
actions were negatively and significantly related to ROA, while financial and 
institutional actions were positively and significantly related to ROA, and institutional 
actions were positively and significantly related to market performance.  The negative 
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effect of strategic actions on ROA is understandable, particularly in light of Woo and 
colleagues’ (1992) assertion that the performance effects of spin-off were felt for many 
years after the separation from the former parent.  It is probable that the effects of 
strategic actions take time to yield performance results, with a short-term dip in 
performance, which was found by Woo and colleagues (1992).  It is also noteworthy that 
institutional actions had a positive effect on market performance.  These actions are 
largely symbolic in nature, and the result suggests that the market is sensitive to the 
signals sent by the spin-off firms. 
Conclusions 
Several conclusions may be drawn from the discussion of this subsection.  
Overall, the empirical evidence linking inaction to performance suggests that the spin-
off event is an opportunity for the spin-off to take action, and failure to do so carries a 
performance consequence.  As prior research has implied (e.g., Seward & Walsh, 1996; 
Woo et al., 1992), the action – performance link is important to understanding what 
happens post spin-off and as such warrants further empirical examination.  Second, the 
empirical evidence suggests that the interaction of specific actions with the relationship 
of the spin-off to its former parent had little effect on spin-off performance, although 
several non-hypothesized relationships between various categories of actions and 
performance were noteworthy.   
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ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
In addition to testing the proposed model on the full five-year post spin-off 
window, an additional analysis was conducted that used only years two through four 
post spin-off.   The rationale for this analysis was that year five differed fundamentally 
from the prior four years and as such may be obscuring the proposed relationships.  
Likewise, the first reporting year for the spin-off firm may be anywhere from 1 to 12 
months in length from the spin-off date, with the average being 4.7 months with a 
standard deviation of 3.5.  Thus, the period from year two to year four may offer a more 
clear view of the proposed relationships.  In addition to the significant relationships 
reported in Chapter VI, the action-based models for the subsample found that having a 
chairman of the board from the parent firm decreased the likelihood of strategic actions 
(β = -.415, p < .10) and that firms related to their former corporate parents were more 
likely to take institutional actions than firms that were unrelated (β = .372, p < .10).  
Thus, in the subsample analysis, H6 and H8c find increased support.  Turning to the 
performance based models, the effects of inaction on performance (H9) were unchanged; 
however, there were several changes in the interactions of the relationship with the 
former parent and the action categories (H10a –H10c).  The significant and positive 
interaction between firms that were vertically integrated and financial actions is no 
longer significant in the model with ROA as the dependent variable, but none of the 
other findings of the original analyses were changed.  There were several additional 
interactions that became significant in the subsample.  First, the interaction of firms that 
were related and financial actions for market performance, which was negative in 
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contrast to H10c (β = -.093, p < .05); next, the interaction between firms that were 
vertically integrated and strategic actions for market performance was positive (β = .094, 
p < .05); and finally, the interaction between firms that were unrelated and financial 
actions for market performance was positive (β = .106, p < .05).  Thus, the subsample 
analysis find slightly stronger support for the proposed relationships than the full sample.   
SUMMARY 
  This chapter discusses the empirical evidence regarding the actions motivated by 
the spin-off event and the performance consequences of those actions.  The discussion 
concludes that the CEO/TMT composition is not an important determinant of likelihood 
of action, that CEO options have no effect on the likelihood of strategic and financial 
actions, that CEO and TMT ownership have mixed effect on the likelihood of action, 
that parent ownership has no effect on the likelihood of strategic actions, and that 
monitoring by a chairman from the parent decrease the likelihood of financial actions, 
while board members from the parent firm have no effect on the likelihood of strategic 
or financial actions.  In terms of performance implications, inaction was negatively 
associated with Tobin’s q and little support was found for the interactions of the spin-
off’s relationship to their parent with the various categories of action. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Spin-offs represent an interesting, but under examined area of strategy research, 
with what occurs post spin-off representing a “black box” to management researchers.  
This research has endeavored to open the “black box” by assessing the effect of the new 
top managers, incentive contracts, managerial ownership, parent ownership, parent 
monitoring, and severance effects on the actions taken post spin-off, and then tie action 
(or inaction) to spin-off performance.  This concluding chapter summarizes the theory 
and empirical evidence of the present study, its limitations, and points out implications 
for future strategy research related to spin-offs as well as implications for managerial 
practice. 
CONCLUSIONS  
  Applying agency, transaction cost, and upper echelons perspectives, this study 
has examined the actions taken by spin-off firms after separation from their corporate 
parent, as well as the performance implications of those actions, all from the spin-off 
firm’s perspective.  While spin-off announcements are generally met with a positive 
stock market reaction (Miles & Rosenfeld, 1983; Schipper & Smith, 1983), the 
performance of firms post spin-off is mixed, with the intervening actions remaining 
largely unexamined (Woo et al., 1992).  This raises questions as to what generates 
positive performance for spin-off firms, with agency, transaction cost, and upper 
echelons theory offering differing, and sometimes conflicting, predictions.  For example, 
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agency theory suggests that better monitoring and incentives will lead to positive spin-
off performance, while transaction cost economics suggests that there will be severance 
effects tied to leaving the corporate structure, potentially leading to performance losses 
or gains.  Upper echelons theory argues that the characteristics of the top management 
and increased organizational discretion will have substantial impact on the actions taken 
by the firm and, consequently, on spin-off performance.   Hence, while multiple 
theoretical perspectives have been applied to examine corporate spin-offs, there has been 
no holistic examination from the firm’s debut through its subsequent years of 
performance.  A more holistic model of post spin-off action and its performance 
implications emerges through reconciling and integrating these theoretical perspectives 
as this research has attempted to do.  In addition, the spin-off event is examined as an 
entrepreneurial opportunity for firm management to exercise their newfound 
organizational discretion free of ties to the former corporate parent.  Guided by these 
theoretical perspectives, this research has provided several insights, which will be 
addressed in two subsections. 
Conclusions Regarding Spin-Off Actions 
  This subsection will address conclusions regarding spin-off actions.  First, while 
a human capital perspective (i.e., Becker, 1964) of the CEO and TMT suggests that their 
background would affect what occurs post spin-off, this was not found in the empirical 
evidence.  But while a direct link between CEO and TMT backgrounds and the various 
categories of actions they take was not found, other questions remain open at this time.  
For example, is the rationale for spin-off or the relationship between the parent and its 
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former division predictors of what type of CEO or TMT is established for the spin-off 
firm?  While this research has taken the CEO / TMT backgrounds as “given” initial 
conditions, the formulation of the CEO and TMT may be more complicated than 
originally thought, necessitating a more complex model of the effect of CEO and TMT 
background on the actions taken post spin-off.  This formulation may bridge the gap 
between the findings of this research and those of Wruck and Wruck (2002), as well as 
the theorized relationships proposed by Hambrick and Stucker (1999).  Hence, although 
this research has clarified the lack of relationship between CEO and TMT background 
and the three categories of spin-off action, other questions remain to be explored.   
  Second, although no relationship was found between CEO options and action, 
this result may not be surprising since CEO options have become so pervasive in the 
upper echelons of all firms.  It is noteworthy that Seward and Walsh (1996) also found 
no relationship between the establishment of incentive contracts and the market reaction 
to the spin-off event.  As such, options may not be as effective a tool in motivating spin-
off firm CEOs as would be expected by agency theory.  In contrast to options, and in line 
with the theory of Hambrick and Stucker (1999), ownership by CEOs and TMTs was 
found to have a significant effect on financial actions, although the effects were in 
different directions.  CEO ownership was found to lower the likelihood of financial 
action while TMT ownership increased the likelihood of financial and strategic actions 
(the coefficient for CEO ownership was negative, but not significant).  Also, although 
not hypothesized, CEO ownership was found to increase the likelihood of institutional 
actions (while the coefficient for TMT ownership was negative, but not significant).   
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Thus, the empirical evidence suggest that perhaps there is risk preference asymmetry 
between the CEO and TMT in terms of the effect of ownership on action.  This is 
understandable since the CEO is the most visible member of the upper echelon and as 
such would be the target of culpability if significant change failed.  This increased risk 
may lower the desire of the CEO to engage in risky actions, preferring instead more 
symbolic institutional actions that change is occurring.  In contrast, the TMT is often 
shielded from external stakeholders by the CEO and as such may have a greater 
penchant for taking the more radical strategic or institutional actions.  As was stated in 
Chapters III and IV, the spin-off event is fraught with risk and this risk may affect the 
desire to take action, even in the presence of opportunity to profitably do so. 
Third, links to the former parent firm were generally found to have no influence 
on action, with the exception of having a chairman of the board from the parent firm, 
which was found to lower the likelihood of financial actions.   It appears that unless the 
former parent retains an active part in the management of the spin-off (i.e., the officer-
level position of chairman of the board), the parent firm is largely ineffectual in 
influencing what actions are taken post spin-off.  Much more curious is the finding of 
this study that the relationship with the parent prior to the spin-off has very little effect 
on the actions taken post spin-off, with the only significant finding being that firms that 
were unrelated take more financial actions than firms that were related.  Several 
researchers (e.g., Miles & Woolridge, 1999; Seward & Walsh, 1996; Woo et al., 1992) 
have proposed that examining the relationship with the former parent prior to spin-off 
may provide deeper insight into what occurs post spin-off, but this was not found to be 
  
 
126
the case.  However, what occurs prior to the spin-off event between the parent and 
division that will be spun-off is largely unobserved, with the possibility that severance 
effects are addressed before the firm separates from its parent.  Archival data are 
inadequate to disentangle this issue, with case studies (i.e., Wruck & Roper, 1997) 
providing the best insights. 
Conclusions from Spin-Off Performance 
Several conclusions may be drawn regarding the performance implications of 
spin-off action.    Woo and colleagues (Woo et al., 1992) examined spin-off performance 
in three years post spin-off and found that the positive market reaction to the spin-off 
may be misguided.  This research went beyond the findings of Woo and colleagues by 
examining the spin-off event as an implicit motivation to take action, and that firms that 
chose not to heed the signal would have lower performance.  Empirical evidence for this 
supposition was found for inaction on Tobin’s q, but none of the other coefficients for 
inaction were significant (although all of them were of the right sign).  This suggests 
some support for the hypothesis that the spin-off event provides an opportunity for 
action to be taken, and bypassing this opportunity has performance consequences for the 
firm.  Also, although no hypotheses were offered regarding the effect of the various 
categories of action on performance, strategic actions were negatively related with ROA, 
financial actions were positively related with ROA, and institutional actions were 
positively related to ROA and market performance.  Building on these findings, future 
research may focus more particularly on the link between action and performance rather 
than inaction and performance.    
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Finally, the theoretical model proposes that the relationship the spin-off had with 
its former corporate parent will influence the actions it takes, and those actions will 
influence spin-off performance.  Based upon the transaction cost rationale proposed by 
Jones and Hill (1988) for the corporate structure, this research proposed that spin-off 
firms unrelated to their parent must take financial actions after spin-off, spin-off firms 
vertically integrated with their parent must take financial and strategic actions after spin-
off, and spin-off firms related to their parent must take institutional, strategic, and 
financial actions after spin-off.  Little support was found across the operating, market 
and hybrid performance measures.   This suggests that the performance implications of 
severance effects from leaving the corporate parent’s structure may not be as important 
as theory would suggest and as such warrants further investigation.   
LIMITATIONS 
The present study has several limitations.  First, the study relied on publicly 
available archival data sources.  Although multiple data sources were used to provide as 
complete a picture as possible, archival data suffer from several limitations.  First, 
missing data can be an issue when archival data are used.  Although no variable had 
more than 25 percent missing data, collectively this left some models with as few as 65 
percent of the possible firm year observations and with as few as 70 percent of the 
possible firms represented.   However, mean difference tests of size relative to parent, 
current ratio and debt to assets indicate that the missing data introduce no systematic 
bias into the analysis.  Moreover, power analysis (Cohen, 1988) indicates that the sample 
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size is sufficient to generate acceptable results.  Nevertheless, missing data is a limitation 
although it did not pose a substantive issue to these analyses.   
Second, archival data are inferior to primary data when measuring change; 
however, given the broad sample (across 44 major industry groups) and the wide sample 
window (1986 to 1997), collection of primary data was not an option.  Case studies have 
provided important insights into the spin-off process (see Wruck & Roper, 1997), but 
this research focused on a broad set of issues common to all spin-offs, making a macro-
level approach more appropriate. 
  Third, the measurement of strategic change is underdeveloped in the 
management literature (Bergh & Fairbank, 2002) and this research has endeavored to 
measure a form of strategic change, conceptualized as strategic, financial, and 
institutional actions.  The measures proposed in this research are new and therefore 
warrant close scrutiny although they are all derived from well-established metrics 
commonly found in strategic management studies (e.g., assets, merger and acquisition 
activity, debt or equity changes, etc.).  As such, the use of this new approach represents a 
methodological contribution beyond the theoretical and empirical contributions. 
  Finally, performance implications of action were measured only one period 
removed from when they were taken.  Woo and colleagues (1992) suggest that the 
performance implications of spin-off may span several years subsequent to spin-off and 
the implications of a given strategic action may not be fully realized in the period 
following when it is taken.  Hence, further analysis modifying the performance window 
may provide greater insight into the implications of actions on performance. 
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IMPLICATIONS 
     This research has provided new insights into what occurs post spin-off by 
examining the relationships between spin-off conditions and actions taken in addition to 
the performance consequences of those actions.  The results have several significant 
implications for both academic research and managerial practice. 
Implications for Theory 
  To begin, this research generally confirms what Gabarro (1987) found at the 
general manager level: that actions fluctuate over the period following a major change.  
It is not surprising to expect that significant change would occur in the first year, but it is 
interesting to note that there is a significant increase in actions from year three to year 
four post spin-off and then a drop in actions year four to year five (see Figures 2 to 5).  
While this research was conducted with much more coarse-grained measures than those 
used by Gabarro, the cyclicality of change remains.   
  Next, a significant contribution of this research is the theory and empirical 
evidence that explores how management composition affects the actions taken.  While 
upper echelons theory states that firms are a reflection of their upper managers 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984), no research in strategy has explored how prior experience 
affects future actions in a situation such as firm spin-off.  In this research, the 
background of the CEO and TMT were found to have no effect on the actions taken by 
the firm post spin-off, suggesting that the human capital arrayed to address the needs of 
the spin-off may not be as important as some have suggested (i.e., Wruck & Wruck, 
2002). 
  
 
130
  Third, the application of agency theory to this research resulted in some 
interesting empirical results.  For example, divergent effects were found between CEO 
or TMT ownership in the spin-off and the actions taken.  Hambrick and Stucker (1999) 
suggested that the significantly higher ownership stake afforded spin-off managers 
(compared to their ownership in the parent firm prior to the spin-off) represented a 
motivation for them to act entrepreneurially in their administration of the spin-off, which 
would suggest that actions would be taken.  Yet it appears that risk preferences differ in 
the upper echelons, with CEO owners preferring symbolic change while the other top 
manager owners preferring more radical change.  Additionally, the finding that parent 
ownership and monitoring by the directors from the parent firm has little effect on the 
likelihood of action is noteworthy.  While an ownership stake might be used to control 
the former division, it is curious that these ties to the parent firm were found to have 
little effect on the spin-off.  The only exception to this is having a corporate officer from 
the parent as the chairman of the spin-off’s board, which was found to limit financial 
actions.  Thus ownership and monitoring of spin-offs by their corporate parents was 
found to be unimportant to the actions taken by the spin-off firm after its separation. 
  Fourth, this research found a limited relationship between the former corporate 
parent and the spin-off firm on the actions taken after the spin-off.  The transaction cost 
rationale for corporate strategy (Jones & Hill, 1988) suggests that there will be links 
between the former division and its parent, and that the severing of those links would 
motivate managers to take various types of actions to assuage the loss.  While the 
hypothesis held for those firms with relationships most distant from their corporate 
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parent (i.e., unrelated firms compared to related firms), it did not hold for those that were 
more closely linked.  This suggests that the severance of the links between the parent 
and the spin-off may occur and be addressed prior to the spin-off such that no significant 
action is needed post spin-off to address the severance effects.   
  Finally, the performance implications of action were mixed and warrant further 
examination.  Although inaction was negatively associated only with Tobin’s q, the 
coefficients of inaction on the other performance measures were all in the right direction 
(negative).  This suggests general support for the assertion that the spin-off event is an 
opportunity to take action and failure to do so will result in lower performance.  
Additionally, as with the action-based models, the interaction of the relationship between 
the former parent firm and the spin-off and the type of actions taken was found to have 
little effect on performance, suggesting again that severance effects are not as 
consequential to spin-off performance as some had suggested (Woo et al., 1992). 
Implications for Managers 
  This research has several implications for managerial practice.  First, the direct 
effect of what CEO/TMT combination is selected to lead the spun-off firm was not 
shown to have implications in terms of what action will be taken post spin-off.  
Although Wruck and Wruck (2002) found that market results were significantly affected 
by the composition of top management at the time of the spin-off, but this research finds 
that the market reaction at the time of the spin-off may be misguided.  Future research 
should examine more closely the implications of background and human capital on the 
spin-off firm, perhaps examining more closely the conditions under which a certain CEO 
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or TMT is selected to manage the spin-off.   For example, a particular CEO type or TMT 
domination may be more appropriate for a spin-off that was related to its parent versus 
one that was unrelated to its parent.  Likewise, CEOs and TMTs selected when the spin-
offs are done to increase focus for the parent firm may differ from those who are 
selected when the spin-offs are financially motivated. 
  Second, empirical evidence suggests that parental monitoring and ownership has 
little effect on the likelihood of action post spin-off.  This portends that parent firms that 
maintain ties to their former divisions on the whole do not seek to hamper their actions, 
also do not encourage action to be pursued.  The notable exception to this was when the 
chairman of the board is a corporate officer of the parent firm, and was found to decrease 
the likelihood of strategic action, suggesting that such a close linkage to the parent may 
be detrimental to the pursuit of opportunity by the spin-off firm.    
  Finally, in terms of performance, the evidence suggests that inaction on the part 
of spin-off firms is negatively related to performance.  While it is impossible a priori to 
know what actions should be taken, the empirical evidence clearly shows that failure to 
approach the spin-off event as an opportunity to take action is associated with 
diminished performance.  
Future Research 
 Looking forward, several future research areas exist.  First, this research has 
focused primarily on how the initial conditions of spin-off influence the actions taken by 
the spin-off firm and the implications of those actions on performance.  This research did 
not examine the direct effect of the “initial conditions” on performance from the three 
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theoretical approaches.  In other words, the prior position of the CEO and the 
domination of the TMT may have a direct effect on performance; similarly, severance 
from the corporate parent may have performance implications that are not directly tied to 
the actions the firm takes post spin-off.  As has been noted in the limitations section, 
action-based research is still nascent and as such needs further refinement.  This does 
not, however, preclude an examination of the direct effects of the initial conditions on 
performance.   
 Second, the action-based portion of this research has been rather coarse-grained, 
rolling up actions into a count variable.  Clearly a more fine-grained examination of the 
three categories of action is warranted and certainly possible from the data collected to 
undertake this study.  In particular, individual action areas could be decomposed into 
their component parts and weights could be assigned to the various actions (given that 
all actions were equally weighted in this research).  Weighting will again provide a more 
fine-grained approach to the analysis of actions and their effect on performance.   
 Finally, as was noted in prior sections, taking on the responsibility for managing 
a spin-off firm is often fraught with strategic, financial, and institutional problems that 
must be addressed.  Moreover, the parent firm chooses the CEO and TMT when the firm 
is spun off, inviting the possibility of adverse selection due to politics internal to the 
parent firm as some authors have suggested (i.e., Wruck & Wruck, 2002).  Thus, 
examining the succession dynamics in the top management of the spin-off firm is 
another area that merits further investigation. 
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The process of detecting and measuring change in strategic management research 
has presented several problems.  Most recently Bergh and Fairbank (2002) critiqued 
several methods for detecting and measuring change, and were highly critical of simple 
difference scores (subtracting one year’s score from the next year’s score), stating that 
they are vulnerable to errors if high correlation exists between observation periods.  
They suggested that predicting residuals based upon regressing Xt-1 on Xt is the best 
method when predicted change (rather than actual change) is measured.  Using this 
approach partials out the correlation between the two values, providing a better sense of 
when true change has occurred.   
For this research the assets, employees, debt, and equity of period t-1 were 
regressed on period t.  The predicted values were then generated using a procedure that 
calculated studentized residuals.  Studentized residuals can be interpreted as the t 
statistic for testing the significance of a dummy variable equal to one in the observation 
in question and zero everywhere else (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980).  After generating 
these values, all studentized residuals for assets, employees, debt, or equity that were 
greater than 1.96 (which is the t statistic that is approximately significant at p < 0.05) 
were coded as one and all others were coded zero. 
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To give the user an overall feeling for a given text, Diction constructs five master 
variables (Activity, Certainty, Realism, Optimism, and Commonality) on the basis of the 
thirty-one individual dictionary scores and four calculated variables.  Master variables 
are calculated by translating raw dictionary totals into Z-scores, adding and subtracting 
them in the appropriate fashion, and then adding constants of 50 to eliminate negative 
numbers.   The scores for the master variables are calculated as follows: 
Variable Equation 
Certainty  (Tenacity + Leveling + Collectives + Insistence) - (Numerical + Ambivalence + Self-Reference + Variety) 
Optimism  (Praise + Satisfaction + Inspiration) - (Blame + Hardship + Denial) 
Reality  
(Familiarity + Spatial Awareness + Temporal Awareness + 
Present Concern + Humanity + Concreteness) - (Past Concern + 
Complexity) 
Activity  (Aggression + Accomplishment + Communication + Motion) - (Cognitive Terms + Passivity + Embellishment) 
Commonality  
 (Centrality + Cooperation + Rapport) - (Diversity + Exclusion + 
Liberation) 
The variables for the equations are described as follows: 
Variable Description 
Accomplishment 
Words expressing task-completion (establish, finish, influence, proceed) 
and organized human behavior (motivated, influence, leader, manage).  
Includes capitalistic terms (buy, produce, employees, sell), modes of 
expansion (grow, increase, generate, construction) and general 
functionality (handling, strengthen, succeed, outputs).  Also included is 
programmatic language: agenda, enacted, working, leadership. 
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Variable Description 
Aggression 
A dictionary embracing human competition and forceful action.  Its 
terms connote physical energy (blast, crash, explode, collide), social 
domination (conquest, attacking, dictatorships, violation), and goal-
directedness (crusade, commanded, challenging, overcome).  In 
addition, words associated with personal triumph (mastered, 
rambunctious, pushy), excess human energy (prod, poke, pound, shove), 
disassembly (dismantle, demolish, overturn, veto) and resistance 
(prevent, reduce, defend, curbed) are included. 
Ambivalence 
Words expressing hesitation or uncertainty, implying a speaker's 
inability or unwillingness to commit to the verbalization being made.  
Included are hedges (allegedly, perhaps, might), statements of 
inexactness (almost, approximate, vague, somewhere) and confusion 
(baffled, puzzling, hesitate).  Also included are words of restrained 
possibility (could, would, he'd) and mystery (dilemma, guess, suppose, 
seems). 
Blame 
Terms designating social inappropriateness (mean, naive, sloppy, stupid) 
as well as downright evil (fascist, blood-thirsty, repugnant, malicious) 
compose this dictionary.  In addition, adjectives describing unfortunate 
circumstances (bankrupt, rash, morbid, embarrassing) or unplanned 
vicissitudes (weary, nervous, painful, detrimental) are included.  The 
dictionary also contains outright denigrations: cruel, illegitimate, 
offensive, miserly. 
Centrality 
Terms denoting institutional regularities and/or substantive agreement 
on core values.  Included are indigenous terms (native, basic, innate) and 
designations of legitimacy (orthodox, decorum, constitutional, ratified), 
systematicity (paradigm, bureaucratic, ritualistic), and typicality 
(standardized, matter-of-fact, regularity).  Also included are terms of 
congruence (conformity, mandate, unanimous), predictability (expected, 
continuity, reliable), and universality (womankind, perennial, 
landmarks). 
Cognitive Terms 
Words referring to cerebral processes, both functional and imaginative.  
Included are modes of discovery (learn, deliberate, consider, compare) 
and domains of study (biology, psychology, logic, economics).  The 
dictionary includes mental challenges (question, forget, re-examine, 
paradoxes), institutional learning practices (graduation, teaching, 
classrooms), as well as three forms of intellection: intuitional (invent, 
perceive, speculate, interpret), rationalistic (estimate, examine, 
reasonable, strategies), and calculative (diagnose, analyze, software, 
fact-finding). 
Collectives 
Singular nouns connoting plurality that function to decrease specificity.  
These words reflect a dependence on categorical modes of thought.  
Included are social groupings (crowd, choir, team, humanity), task 
groups (army, congress, legislature, staff) and geographical entities 
(county, world, kingdom, republic). 
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Variable Description 
Communication 
Terms referring to social interaction, both face-to-face (listen, interview, 
read, speak) and mediated (film, videotape, telephone, e-mail).  The 
dictionary includes both modes of intercourse (translate, quote, scripts, 
broadcast) and moods of intercourse (chat, declare, flatter, demand).  
Other terms refer to social actors (reporter, spokesperson, advocates, 
preacher) and a variety of social purposes (hint, rebuke, respond, 
persuade). 
Complexity Characters/Words 
Concreteness 
A large dictionary possessing no thematic unity other than tangibility 
and materiality.  Included are sociological units (peasants, African-
Americans, Catholics), occupational groups (carpenter, manufacturer, 
policewoman), and political alignments (Communists, congressman, 
Europeans).  Also incorporated are physical structures (courthouse, 
temple, store), forms of diversion (television, football, CD-ROM), terms 
of accountancy (mortgage, wages, finances), and modes of 
transportation (airplane, ship, bicycle).  In addition, the dictionary 
includes body parts (stomach, eyes, lips), articles of clothing (slacks, 
pants, shirt), household animals (cat, insects, horse) and foodstuffs 
(wine, grain, sugar), and general elements of nature (oil, silk, sand). 
Cooperation 
Terms designating behavioral interactions among people that often 
result in a group product.  Included are designations of formal work 
relations (unions, schoolmates, caucus) and informal associations 
(chum, partner, cronies) to more intimate interactions (sisterhood, 
friendship, comrade).  Also included are neutral interactions 
(consolidate, mediate, alignment), job-related tasks (network, détente, 
exchange), personal involvement (teamwork, sharing, contribute), and 
self-denial (public-spirited, care-taking, self-sacrifice). 
Denial 
A dictionary consisting of standard negative contractions (aren't, 
shouldn't, don't), negative functions words (nor, not, nay), and terms 
designating null sets (nothing, nobody, none). 
Diversity 
Words describing individuals or groups of individuals differing from the 
norm.  Such distinctiveness may be comparatively neutral (inconsistent, 
contrasting, non-conformist) but it can also be positive (exceptional, 
unique, individualistic) and negative (illegitimate, rabble-rouser, 
extremist).  Functionally, heterogeneity may be an asset (far-flung, 
dispersed, diffuse) or a liability (factionalism, deviancy, quirky) as can 
its characterizations: rare vs. queer, variety vs. jumble, distinctive vs. 
disobedient. 
Embellishment Adjectives / Verbs 
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Variable Description 
Exclusion 
A dictionary describing the sources and effects of social isolation.  Such 
seclusion can be phrased passively (displaced, sequestered) as well as 
positively (self-contained, self-sufficient) and negatively (outlaws, 
repudiated).  Moreover, it can result from voluntary forces (secede, 
privacy) and involuntary forces (ostracize, forsake, discriminate) and 
from both personality factors (small-mindedness, loneliness) and 
political factors (right-wingers, nihilism).  Exclusion is often a 
dialectical concept: hermit vs.  derelict, refugee vs. pariah, discard vs.  
spurn). 
Familiarity 
Consists of a selected number of C.K. Ogden's "operation" words that he 
calculates to be the most common words in the English language.  
Included are common prepositions (across, over, through), 
demonstrative pronouns (this, that) and interrogative pronouns (who, 
what), and a variety of particles, conjunctions and connectives (a, for, 
so). 
Hardship 
This dictionary contains natural disasters (earthquake, starvation, 
tornado, pollution), hostile actions (killers, bankruptcy, enemies, vices) 
and censurable human behavior (infidelity, despots, betrayal).  It also 
includes unsavory political outcomes (injustice, slavery, exploitation, 
rebellion) as well as normal human fears (grief, unemployment, died, 
apprehension) and incapacities (error, cop-outs, weakness). 
Human Interest 
An adaptation of Rudolf Flesch's notion that concentrating on people 
and their activities gives discourse a life-like quality.  Included are 
standard personal pronouns (he, his, ourselves, them), family members 
and relations (cousin, wife, grandchild, uncle), and generic terms 
(friend, baby, human, persons). 
Insistence (Heavily Used Words x Total Occurrences)/10 
Inspiration 
Abstract virtues deserving of universal respect.  Most of the terms in this 
dictionary are nouns isolating desirable moral qualities (faith, honesty, 
self-sacrifice, virtue) as well as attractive personal qualities (courage, 
dedication, wisdom, mercy).  Social and political ideals are also 
included: patriotism, success, education, justice. 
Leveling 
Words used to ignore individual differences and to build a sense of 
completeness and assurance.  Included are totalizing terms (everybody, 
anyone, each, fully), adverbs of permanence (always, completely, 
inevitably, consistently), and resolute adjectives (unconditional, 
consummate, absolute, open-and-shut). 
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Variable Description 
Liberation 
Terms describing the maximizing of individual choice (autonomous, 
open-minded, options) and the rejection of social conventions 
(unencumbered, radical, released).  Liberation is motivated by both 
personality factors (eccentric, impetuous, flighty) and political forces 
(suffrage, liberty, freedom, emancipation) and may produce dramatic 
outcomes (exodus, riotous, deliverance) or subdued effects (loosen, 
disentangle, outpouring).  Liberatory terms also admit to rival 
characterizations: exemption vs. loophole, elope vs. abscond, 
uninhibited vs. outlandish. 
Motion 
Terms connoting human movement (bustle, job, lurch, leap), physical 
processes (circulate, momentum, revolve, twist), journeys (barnstorm, 
jaunt, wandering, travels), speed (lickety-split, nimble, zip, whistle-
stop), and modes of transit (ride, fly, glide, swim). 
Numerical Terms 
Any sum, date, or product specifying the facts in a given case.  This 
dictionary treats each isolated integer as a single "word" and each 
separate group of integers as a single word.  In addition, the dictionary 
contains common numbers in lexical format (one, tenfold, hundred, 
zero) as well as terms indicating numerical operations (subtract, divide, 
multiply, percentage) and quantitative topics (digitize, tally, 
mathematics).  The presumption is that Numerical Terms hyper-specify 
a claim, thus detracting from its universality. 
Passivity 
Words ranging from neutrality to inactivity.  Includes terms of 
compliance (allow, tame, appeasement), docility (submit, contented, 
sluggish), and cessation (arrested, capitulate, refrain, yielding).  Also 
contains tokens of inertness (backward, immobile, silence, inhibit) and 
disinterest (unconcerned, nonchalant, stoic), as well as tranquility 
(quietly, sleepy, vacation). 
Past Concern The past-tense forms of the verbs contained in the Present Concern dictionary. 
Praise 
Affirmations of some person, group, or abstract entity.  Included are 
terms isolating important social qualities (dear, delightful, witty), 
physical qualities (mighty, handsome, beautiful), intellectual qualities 
(shrewd, bright, vigilant, reasonable), entrepreneurial qualities 
(successful, conscientious, renowned), and moral qualities (faithful, 
good, noble).  All terms in this dictionary are adjectives. 
Present Concern 
A selective list of present-tense verbs extrapolated from C.K. Ogden's 
list of "general" and "picturable" terms, all of which occur with great 
frequency in standard American English.  The dictionary is not topic-
specific but points instead to general physical activity (cough, taste, 
sing, take), social operations (canvass, touch, govern, meet), and task-
performance (make, cook, print, paint). 
Rapport 
This dictionary describes attitudinal similarities among groups of 
people.  Included are terms of affinity (congenial, camaraderie, 
companion), assent (approve, vouched, warrants), deference (tolerant, 
willing, permission), and identity (equivalent, resemble, consensus). 
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Variable Description 
Satisfaction 
Terms associated with positive affective states (cheerful, passionate, 
happiness), with moments of undiminished joy (thanks, smile, welcome) 
and pleasurable diversion (excited, fun, lucky), or with moments of 
triumph (celebrating, pride, auspicious).  Also included are words of 
nurturance: healing, encourage, secure, relieved. 
Self-Reference 
All first-person references, including I, I'd, I'll, I'm, I've, me, mine, my, 
myself.  Self-references are treated as acts of "indexing" whereby the 
locus of action appears to reside in the speaker and not in the world at 
large (thereby implicitly acknowledging the speaker's limited vision). 
Spatial Awareness 
Terms referring to geographical entities, physical distances, and modes 
of measurement.  Included are general geographical terms (abroad, 
elbow-room, locale, outdoors) as well as specific ones (Ceylon, Kuwait, 
Poland).  Also included are politically defined locations (county, 
fatherland, municipality, ward), points on the compass (east, southwest) 
and the globe (latitude, coastal, border, snowbelt), as well as terms of 
scale (kilometer, map, spacious), quality (vacant, out-of-the-way, 
disoriented) and change (pilgrimage, migrated, frontier.) 
Temporal Awareness 
Terms that fix a person, idea, or event within a specific time-interval, 
thereby signaling a concern for concrete and practical matters.  The 
dictionary designates literal time (century, instant, mid-morning) as well 
as metaphorical designations (lingering, seniority, nowadays).  Also 
included are calendrical terms (autumn, year-round, weekend), elliptical 
terms (spontaneously, postpone, transitional), and judgmental terms 
(premature, obsolete, punctual). 
Tenacity 
All uses of the verb "to be" (is, am, will, shall), three definitive verb 
forms (has, must, do) and their variants, as well as all associated 
contractions (he'll, they've, ain't).  These verbs connote confidence and 
totality. 
Variety Different Words / Total Words 
 
A sampling of annual financial reports from a variety of Fortune 500 companies, 
including 3M, Ford, Merck, Dynatech, etc. were run through the software to establish 
the tolerances for corporate financial reports.  These tolerances were used in this 
research to determine when a shareholder letter or a management discussion registered a 
score that was “out of range” for the master variables.  A dummy variable was set to one 
if the letter or discussion registered out of range and zero if it did not.  Comparisons 
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were then made between years, with a change in score, either from zero to one or from 
one to zero, recorded as a change in tone.   
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APPENDIX E 
SPIN-OFF AND PARENT FIRMS 
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Year Spin-off Spin-off SIC Parent Parent SIC
1986 Anadarko Petroleum 1311 Panhandle Eastern  4922 
1986 Kirschner Medical 3840 Hazleton Labs  7391 
1986 North American Communications 4830 Communications System 3661 
1986 Premark International 3089 Kraft 2022 
1986 VWR 7330 Univar  2833 
1986 York International 3585 Borg Warner  2821 
1987 Abitibi-Price 2621 Gulf Canada 2952 
1987 Aspen Leaf 5650 Bayly  2328 
1987 Broadway Holdings 7010 American Midland  7010 
1987 Csc Industries 3310 Copperweld  3316 
1987 Cyclops Industries 3316 Alleghany 6611 
1987 Diamond Shamrock 2810 Maxus Energy  2812 
1987 Grow Ventures 3410 Grow Group 2851 
1987 Gulf Canada Resources 1311 Gulf Canada 2952 
1987 Hancock Fabrics 5949 Lucky Stores 5411 
1987 Imo Delavel 3612 Transamerica  6711 
1987 Intertan 5730 Tandy  5732 
1987 Kay Jewlers 5094 Kay  5944 
1987 Nieman Marcus 5311 Carter Hawley Hale Stores 5311 
1987 Nycor 3580 Fedders  3714 
1987 Sprague Technologies 3675 Penn Central  4011 
1988 A P Green Industries 3290 U S G  3275 
1988 Baroid New 7359 N L Industries 1389 
1988 BHA Group 3560 Standard Havens 3564 
1988 Concorde Career lleges 8240 Cencor 6145 
1988 Corcap 2822 Lydall 2631 
1988 Dekalb Genetics 5191 Dekalb Energy  1380 
1988 Electronic Research Associates 3679 REFAC Technology  7397 
1988 Fibreboard 2653 Louisiana Pacific  2436 
1988 First Financial Caribbean 6160 Culbro  2121 
1988 Genlyte Group 3640 Bairnco  6711 
1988 KCS Group 5170 N U I  6711 
1988 Ketema 3354 Ametek 3822 
1988 Medusa 3241 Crane  3494 
1988 Michigan Consolidated Gas 4924 Primark  2751 
1988 Pride Petroleum Services 1310 Dekalb Energy  1380 
1988 S A Y Packaging 3070 Scribe Systems 3079 
1988 Sun Exploration & Production 1382 Sun 2911 
1988 Sunstyle 1520 Raymond James Financial 6211 
1988 Tejas Gas 1311 Hamilton Oil  1311 
1989 Allergan 2834 Smithkline Beckman 2834 
1989 API Print 6799 Affiliated Publications 2711 
1989 Atrix Laboratories 2830 Vipont Pharmaceutical 2830 
1989 Beckman Instruments 3826 Smithkline Beckman 2834 
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Year Spin-off Spin-off SIC Parent Parent SIC
1989 Burlington Resources 3312 Burlington Northern 4011 
1989 Cray Computer 3570 Cray Research 3573 
1989 Eljer 6141 Household International 6145 
1989 Geotek Industries 3690 Patlex  7390 
1989 Henley Group 2830 Wheelabrator Group 2830 
1989 IFR Systems 3610 Regency Electronics 3662 
1989 Kaufman & Broad Home 1521 Broad 1521 
1989 Matlack Systems 4213 R L C  7512 
1989 RSI Holdings 5080 Delta Woodside 5021 
1989 Schwitzer 6141 Household International 6145 
1989 Scotsman Industries 6141 Household International 6145 
1989 Showbiz Pizzatime 5812 Integra A Hotel & Restaurant 7011 
1989 Tredegar Industries 3081 Ethyl  2899 
1989 Trimas 3690 Masco  3432 
1989 Vivra 8031 Community Psychiatric  8063 
1989 Waban 5331 Zayre  5311 
1989 Yankee Energy System 4920 Northeast Utilities 4911 
1990 Aerovox 3620 Cooper Industries 3511 
1990 Alliant Techsystems 3679 Honeywell 3483 
1990 American Savings & Loan Assn 6030 Enstar Group 8351 
1990 Catellus Development 6552 Santa Fe Pac  1311 
1990 Datronix Financial Services 7389 B S D Bancorp 6711 
1990 E S C O Electronics 3577 Emerson Electric  3621 
1990 Firstmiss Gold 1040 First Mississippi  2819 
1990 Henley Group 2830 Henley Properties 2830 
1990 Hillhaven 8072 National Medical Enterprises 8062 
1990 Keene 3670 Bairnco  6711 
1990 Momentum 7330 VWR 7330 
1990 Pool Energy Services 1380 Enserch 4924 
1990 Promus 7011 Holiday  7011 
1990 Southern Union 4923 Metro Mobile 4813 
1990 Unitrin 6320 Teledyne 3662 
1990 Venture Stores 5311 May Department Stores  5311 
1990 Videocart 3660 Information Resources 7370 
1991 Biowhittaker 2835 Whittaker  2851 
1991 Celtrix Laboratories 2830 Collagen  3840 
1991 Fisher Price 5092 Quaker Oats  2043 
1991 Lawyers Title Conversion 6361 Universal Corp 5159 
1991 National Health Investors 8011 National Healthcorp 8049 
1991 PET 2023 Whitman  2086 
1991 Rigel Energy 1311 Total Petroleum North America 2911 
1991 Tandy Brands Accessories 3170 Bombay Company 5712 
1992 A C X Technologies 3260 Adolph Coors 2082 
1992 Abex 3728 Henley Group 2830 
1992 Caremark International 8099 Baxter International 2834 
1992 Control Data Systems 7370 Ceridian  3571 
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Year Spin-off Spin-off SIC Parent Parent SIC
1992 General Cable 3350 Penn Central  4011 
1992 GFC Financial 6153 Dial 4131 
1992 Indresco 3533 Dresser Industries 1031 
1992 Praxair 2819 Union Carbide 2819 
1992 Precision Systems 2810 Home Shopping Network 7299 
1992 Spacelabs Medical 3600 Advanced Technology Labs  3840 
1992 Worldtex 2241 Willcox & Gibbs 3636 
1993 Alltrista 5050 Ball  3221 
1993 Alumax 3334 Amax 1011 
1993 Anika Research 2830 Medchem Products 2819 
1993 Aptargroup 3089 Pittway 6712 
1993 Aviall 7699 Ryder System 4210 
1993 Contempri Homes 1521 E S I Industries 1382 
1993 Dean Witter Discover 6211 Sears Roebuck 5311 
1993 Diasonics Ultrasound 5040 O E C Medical Systems 2835 
1993 Dovatron International 3670 Dover  3534 
1993 First Colony 6311 Ethyl  2899 
1993 Galen Health Care 8399 Humana 8062 
1993 Lone Star Casino 7990 Viral Testing Systems 3575 
1993 Mai Systems 3571 Brooke Group Ltd 2111 
1993 Marriott International 7011 Host Marriott  7011 
1993 Mental Health Management 8099 Mediq 3851 
1993 Phillips & Jacobs 3860 Tasty Baking  6711 
1993 Ralston Continental Baking Group 2047 Ralston Purina  2041 
1994 Airtouch Communications 7372 Pacific Telesis Group 4811 
1994 Albemarle 2819 Ethyl  2899 
1994 Associated Group 4830 Associated Communications 4832 
1994 Belding Heminway 2200 Noel Group 1380 
1994 Eastman Chemical  3861 Eastman Kodak  3830 
1994 Gardner Denver Machinery 3530 Cooper Industries 3511 
1994 Genzyme - Tissue Repair 2840 Genzyme  2840 
1994 Harris Computer Systems 7370 Harris  3662 
1994 Lone Star Industries 3272 Lone Star Corp 3272 
1994 Qlogic 3670 Emulex 3570 
1994 Ralcorp Holdings 2047 Ralston Purina Group 2047 
1994 Rayonier 2620 ITT 3661 
1994 Santa Fe Pacific Gold 1041 Santa Fe Pacific 1311 
1994 Western Atlas 1389 Litton Industries 3570 
1995 Airways 4510 Mesaba Holdings 4510 
1995 Allstate 6331 Sears Roebuck 5311 
1995 Capital One Financial 6141 Signet Banking  6025 
1995 Castle & Cooke 2033 Dole Foods 2033 
1995 Cooper Cameron 3530 Cooper Industries 3512 
1995 Crown Vantage 2620 James River 6711 
1995 Culligan Water Technologies 3589 Samsonite 3161 
1995 Darden Restaurants 5812 General Mills 2043 
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Year Spin-off Spin-off SIC Parent Parent SIC
1995 Dave & Busters 5800 Edison Brothers Stores In 5661 
1995 Hartford Financial Svcs Group 6331 ITT Industries Ind 3594 
1995 Healthdyne Technologies 3840 US Healthdyne 3840 
1995 Patlex 3840 Autofinance Group 6140 
1995 Republic Environmental Systems 4950 Republic Waste Industries 4950 
1995 Schweitzer Mauduit Intl 8011 Kimberly Clark  2621 
1995 Sterling Commerce 3577 Sterling Software 7379 
1995 Transpro 3444 Allen Group 3714 
1995 U S Industries 2522 Hanson PLC 6733 
1996 Advanced Digital Information 3570 Interpoint 3670 
1996 Allegiance 2834 Baxter International 2834 
1996 Bally Total Fitness 7990 Bally Entertainment  7011 
1996 Billing Information Concepts 7370 US Long Distance 4810 
1996 Bone Care International 2830 Lunar  3840 
1996 Cardiotech International 3845 Polymedica Industries 3842 
1996 Chemfirst 6036 First Mississippi  2819 
1996 Choice Hotels International 7011 Manor Care 8059 
1996 Cuno 3560 Commercial Intertech  3561 
1996 Data Translation  3570 Media 100 3573 
1996 Earthgrains  5149 Anheuser Busch 2082 
1996 Echelon International 6512 Florida Progress  4911 
1996 Electronic Data Systems 3679 General Motors  3711 
1996 Highlands Insurance Group 6311 Halliburton 1389 
1996 Host Marriott Services 7011 Host Marriott  7011 
1996 Imation 3572 3M 2640 
1996 Imperial Tabacco 2111 Hanson PLC 6733 
1996 Millennium Chemical 2813 Hanson PLC 6733 
1996 National Medical Care 8059 Grace W R & Co 4400 
1996 Newport News Shipbuilding 3731 Tenneco Automotive 3523 
1996 Payless Shoesource 5661 May Department Stores  5310 
1996 Pittston Bax Group 1221 Pittston 1221 
1996 Tupperware 3089 Premark International 3089 
1996 Union Pacific Resources Group 1311 Union Pacific  4000 
1996 Unisource 6552 Alco Standard  2891 
1996 Viad 4131 Dial 4131 
1997 Arvinmeritor 3714 Rockwell International  3465 
1997 Ascent Entertainment Group 4840 Comsat 4899 
1997 ATL Products 3570 Odetics 3570 
1997 Cable Michigan 4840 C Tec  4810 
1997 Ensearch Exploration 4924 Enserch 4924 
1997 Mego Mortgage 6160 Mego Financial  6530 
1997 Monterey Resources 1099 Santa Fe Energy Resources 1311 
1997 Raytheon 3812 General Motors  3711 
1997 RCN 4840 C Tec  4810 
1997 Solutia 3089 Monsanto  2823 
1997 Tricon Global Restaurants 5812 Pepsico 2086 
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